Shafik Bhalloo
Thursday, October 8th, 2015    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.
Alisha Parmar
Alisha joined Kornfeld LLP as an associate in 2015 after completing her articles with the firm.

When an employee is wrongfully dismissed and the court determines that the employee is entitled to damages in lieu of reasonable notice, the employer will almost always argue that the employee was required to mitigate those damages and failed.  In essence, the employer will allege that the employee failed to take reasonable steps to obtain alternative employment, and that if the employee had taken those steps, then the damages suffered by the employee from wrongful dismissal would have been reduced.  If the court agrees that there was a failure to mitigate, then the employee may be barred from recovering a portion of the damages arising from wrongful dismissal on the basis that those damages could have been prevented by the employee.  Notably, mitigation does not require the employee to accept just any offer of employment in an effort to mitigate – as an example, the court will not find a failure to mitigate where a CEO declines to accept employment as a cashier at a fast-food restaurant, since those two positions are not at all comparable.

An interesting situation arises when the former employer offers the employee re-employment on the same terms.  The question then becomes whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have accepted the employer’s offer of re-employment.[1]  In Fredrickson v. Newtech Dental Laboratory Inc., 2015 BCCA 357 (“Fredrickson”), the British Columbia Court of Appeal recently considered that scenario and held the employee did not fail to mitigate by declining an offer of re-employment, where the offer did not fully compensate her for lost income, and where the trust relationship between the employee and employer had deteriorated because of the employer’s actions.

The Decision                                          

In Fredrickson, the plaintiff employee was employed as a dental technician assistant by the defendant company, for a period of eight and a half years.  The plaintiff had a good working relationship with the owner of the defendant company, her “boss”, and they worked closely together in a small office.

In 2011, the plaintiff came under stress resulting from her husband’s illness and her son being involved in an accident, both of which her boss was aware of.  On April 28, 2011, the plaintiff went on a medical leave of absence without informing the defendant that she was doing so.  While the plaintiff was on leave, the defendant disputed her entitlement to take leave and there was some contention that the defendant did not properly respond to the plaintiff’s request to complete Employment Insurance forms. During this time, the plaintiff’s boss surreptitiously recorded two conversations with the plaintiff, which were later used by the defendant at trial.

On July 20, 2011 the plaintiff returned to work after her doctor advised her that she was fit to do so.  On the same day, the defendant informed her that she was laid off because of insufficient work, and provided the plaintiff with a record of employment and a letter of reference.  The plaintiff, through counsel, sent a demand letter to the defendant on September 9, 2011.  In that letter, the plaintiff took the position that she had been wrongfully dismissed when she was laid off in July.

The defendant responded to that letter with an offer of re-employment, with re-employment commencing September 26, 2011, and stated that the plaintiff had an obligation to mitigate her damages by accepting re-employment.  Then, on October 19, 2011, shortly after the plaintiff had commenced her action against the defendant claiming wrongful dismissal, the defendant made a second offer to re-employ the plaintiff including an offer to pay her unpaid wages from July 20, 2011 until September 26, 2011.  Following this, on October 25, November 4, 2011, and April 19, 2012, the defendant made three further offers to re-employ the defendant, including payment of lost wages from July 20, 2011 to September 23, 2011 (the date the first re-employment offer was made), at the same position, with identical salary and benefits, as before.  The plaintiff declined all of these offers.

At trial, the plaintiff was successful at showing that she was wrongfully dismissed, and in fact, the defendant acknowledged that it had dismissed the plaintiff without cause and without reasonable notice in its closing submissions.  Thus, the only issue that remained was whether the plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages.

The plaintiff tendered evidence that she had applied for nearly 100 jobs, and was not successful obtaining any of those positions, until she eventually secured a position as a bookkeeper in August 2012.  However, the trial judge concluded it would have been reasonable for the plaintiff to accept re-employment by the defendant and that by failing to do so she had failed to mitigate her losses.  As a result, the plaintiff was only awarded damages from the period between July 20, 2011 and September 23, 2011, the date the first offer was made.

The plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge’s finding on mitigation.  The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by (1) “failing to accord significance to the incomplete nature of the offer” and by (2) “failing to reflect the intangible element of mutual trust, commensurate with the nature of employment, that flows like a current in the employment relationship”.[2]

On the first point, the Court of Appeal stated that none of the offers made by the defendant were “make whole” offers, in that the offers did not fully compensate the plaintiff for her lost income following July 20, 2011.  The first offer did not include an offer to compensate the plaintiff for the income she had lost between July 20 and September 26, 2011.  The second offer did not compensate the plaintiff for the lost income between September 26, 2011 to October 18, 2011, and each of the other offers left a similar gap in the compensation being offered to the plaintiff.   As such, the “offers coming from Newtech to Ms. Fredrickson never caught up to her loss of income situation”.[3]  The Court of Appeal held the trial judge did not give adequate consideration to the gap in income between the plaintiff’s claim for wrongful dismissal and the defendant’s offers of re-employment, since even the earliest offer for compensation resulted in the plaintiff losing 8% of her annual income.[4] Further, if the plaintiff accepted the offer of re-employment, she would have a very difficult time maintaining a claim for the lost income.[5]

Aside from this, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by not considering the trust relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.  The Court stated that whether or not a reasonable person would accept an offer of re-employment includes an assessment of the obligations of good faith or fidelity on the part of the employer and employee, since mutual trust is an important aspect of the employment relationship.[6]   The Court held that the plaintiff’s trust in the defendant had been eroded by the defendant’s actions in at least two ways.  First, as stated previously, the plaintiff’s boss had secretly recorded conversations with her and then used those conversations at trial.  Second, her boss had engaged in conversation with another employee, in which he agreed that the plaintiff would be too embarrassed to return to work with the defendant.  Interestingly, the Court found that whether or not the plaintiff felt “embarrassed” was inconsequential, and what mattered was that her boss had breached the confidence of the plaintiff by having this conversation, particularly in the context of a small workplace.  The Court found that as a result of the defendant’s actions, “any chance of repairing the employment relationship was irretrievably lost”.  The Court of Appeal’s reasoning suggested that even if the offers had been “make whole” offers, the trial judge’s finding would still not have been upheld because the employee no longer trusted the employer. Thus, the decision illustrates in some situations, it will not matter that re-employment was offered, since the damage has already been done.

[1] Fredrickson at para. 29

[2] Fredrickson at para. 23

[3] Fredrickson at para. 24

[4] Fredrickson at para. 26

[5] Fredrickson at para. 27

[6] Fredrickson at para. 29

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Devin Lucas
Thursday, July 30th, 2015    Posted by Devin Lucas (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts)
Devin Lucas
Devin Lucas maintains a general civil litigation practice with a focus on corporate and commercial litigation and landlord tenant and real property disputes. His commercial litigation experience includes contractual disputes, employment matters, and debtor-creditor law.
Alisha Parmar
Alisha joined Kornfeld LLP as an associate in 2015 after completing her articles with the firm.

The Supreme Court of British Columbia recently clarified renewal rights in the context of a commercial lease in The Zone Bowling Centre (2002) Ltd. v. 14100 Entertainment Blvd. Investments Ltd., 2015 BCSC 524.

The decision stresses the importance of parties to a lease reading and understanding their rights and obligations in the context of a lease renewal clause.  If the lease requires it, it is prudent for the tenant to exercise the option to renew in time and in writing.  If the tenant fails to do as the lease requires and instead enters into lease renewal negotiations with the landlord, the tenant does so at his own peril and with no guarantee that the landlord will allow the tenant to remain at the leased premises.  As this case demonstrates, courts are loathe to interfere with contractual certainty as bargained between two commercial parties and subsequent negotiations may not be enough to revive the right of renewal if it is not validly exercised by the tenant.

Summary of Facts

The Zone Bowling Centre (“the Zone”) operated a popular bowling alley and brew pub in the Riverport Sports & Entertainment Park in Richmond, British Columbia.  The Zone, as tenant, had entered into a lease with 14100 Entertainment Blvd. (the “Original Owner”), as landlord, for the premises (“Premises”).  The initial term of the lease was 10 years ending on April 30, 2014, with three lease renewal options, each for an additional five years.  Prior to expiry of the initial term, the Original Owner sold the Premises and assigned the lease to 0984972 BC Ltd. (the “New Owner”).

Under the lease, the landlord covenanted with the Zone to grant a renewal of the lease, if the Zone:

1)      gave notice to the landlord that the Zone “wishes to obtain a renewal of this Lease” not earlier than twelve months and not later than nine months before the expiry of the initial term;

2)      was not in breach of any covenant or condition of the lease at the time of the renewal notice to the landlord; and

3)      had duly and regularly observed and performed the covenants and conditions contained in the lease.

The lease further required that any notice provided under the lease be in writing.

As the initial term was to expire on April 30, 2014, the cut-off date for the Zone to exercise the first renewal option was July 31, 2013.  However, the Zone did not exercise its renewal option until August 2013 and even then, it failed to do so in writing.  Further, throughout the term of the lease, the Zone was late in paying rent and, in fact, rent was overdue on July 31, 2013.

Despite this, after missing the cut-off date, the Zone entered into lease renewal negotiations with the Original Owner and later, the New Owner, as landlord.  These discussions broke down in July, 2014.  At this time, the New Owner informed the Zone that it did not consider that the option to renew had been validly exercised and instead considered the Zone to be an overholding tenant on a month to month tenancy.

On October 27, 2014, the New Owner gave the Zone written notice terminating the lease effective November 30, 2014.  In spite of this, the Zone continued to occupy the Premises based on the its view that it had properly exercised the renewal option.  The Zone then brought a petition, seeking a declaration that it had properly exercised the option to renew.

The Decision

The issue before the Court was whether or not the Zone had exercised the first renewal option under the lease.  To determine whether the option had been validly exercised, the Court analyzed whether the three conditions precedent set out in the lease had been met by the Zone.

Based on the evidence before the Court, Mr. Justice Bowden found that the Zone had not exercised the renewal option by July 31, 2013.  Furthermore, Mr. Justice Bowden held that during the period from June 1, 2013 to September 25, 2013 the Zone was in arrears in paying rent and, therefore, was in breach of its duties under the lease during the time that the Zone had allegedly exercised its renewal option.  Finally, on account of the Zone being consistently in default of its obligation to pay rent, it could not be said that the Zone had “duly and regularly performed its obligations” throughout the 10 year term of the lease.

Even so, the Zone argued that the respondents had waived strict compliance with the lease and the conditions precedent to the exercise of the option by accepting rent when payments were overdue, and that the respondents were precluded from alleging a breach of the lease as a basis for denying the renewal, given the continuing lease renewal negotiations among the parties.

The Court found the respondents’ late acceptance of rent payments did not amount to a waiver of their right to require the Zone to strictly comply with the preconditions to exercise the option to renew – at most, it could amount to a waiver of the landlord’s  right to terminate the lease on the basis of the Zone’s breach of its obligation to pay rent.  Further, as the Court found that there was no evidence that the respondents had promised the Zone it could exercise the renewal option without providing notice in writing, nor by providing notice after the cut-off date specified in the lease, the landlord was not precluded from insisting on enforcing its strict legal rights in connection with the renewal option

Finally, although the Court noted the potentially significant adverse impact on the Zone’s business, the Court found that the alternative remedy of “relief from forfeiture” – which often allows tenants who have been in breach one opportunity to reinstate it – was not available to the Zone in this case. By failing to exercise the option properly the Zone had not forfeited an existing tenancy, but instead had simply lost the right of renewal, so relief from forfeiture could not apply.

Thus, despite its efforts, the Zone was not able to salvage its option to renew.  (It was later reported that the parties had reached an agreement after this decision was handed down and the Zone was able to continue operating at the Premises.  We do not know the terms of that agreement.)

This case is a reminder to all contracting parties that if they intend to engage in negotiations during the currency of a contract, they should never do so without securing a legally enforceable agreement by the other side that it will not require strict compliance with the contract terms while the negotiations are underway.


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Posted by Devin Lucas (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts) | Filed under Litigation and ADR, Real Estate Law | ...
Shafik Bhalloo
Friday, June 26th, 2015    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.
Alisha Parmar
Alisha joined Kornfeld LLP as an associate in 2015 after completing her articles with the firm.

One of the most significant mistakes a business owner can make when it comes to engaging a worker is classifying that worker incorrectly.  Many business owners are aware that misclassifying an employee as an independent contractor can come with heavy repercussions, including being held liable for the various statutory deductions that should be made for an employee (see our previous post on determining employment status here).

However, fewer business owners seem to be aware that an intermediate category of worker exists between employee and independent contractor.  Where a worker is not an employee but is sufficiently economically dependent on a particular client, that worker may well be a “dependent contractor”.  The key factor to consider whether a worker is a dependent contractor rather than an independent contractor is “exclusivity”.  If the contractor relies heavily on a single client, for a long period of time, this points towards dependent contractor status.[1]

One area in which the distinction between an independent and dependent contractor matters is notice of termination.  Where a worker is a dependent contractor, in contrast to an independent contractor, she will be entitled to reasonable notice of termination.[2]   Where no such notice is given, the business owner may be held liable for damages in lieu of notice.  The Ontario Superior Court’s recent decision in Keenan v. Canac Kitchens (“Keenan”) demonstrates just how significant these damages can be.[3]

In Keenan, the two plaintiff workers had worked for the defendant company for 33 and 26 years respectively.  The defendant was in the business of supplying kitchen cabinets.  For the first eleven and four years, respectively, the plaintiffs were engaged as employees of the defendant.  For part of that time, the plaintiffs were employed as foremen.  This initial period of employment ended when the defendant company decided to enter into a new arrangement with the plaintiffs.  Under this new arrangement, the plaintiffs would be responsible for and had to pay workers who would install the cabinets, and further, were required to provide some of their own equipment.  The defendant also suggested that the plaintiffs incorporate a company through which to provide these services (although the plaintiffs never did) and the plaintiffs were permitted to work for, and did in fact work for, a competing company after the new arrangement commenced.  All of these factors seemed to suggest independent contractor status.

So, when the defendant company started experiencing financial difficulties it gave the plaintiffs very little notice that their services were being terminated.   According to the defendant, under the terms of the new agreement the plaintiffs were not entitled to any notice – let alone reasonable notice.

The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiffs were in fact dependent contractors.  Even though the plaintiffs worked for a competing company and despite all of the other factors that pointed towards independent contractor status, the plaintiffs primarily worked for the defendant and most of the plaintiffs’ revenues were attributable to the defendant.   As a result of this reliance on the defendant, the plaintiffs were entitled to reasonable notice of termination.   Due to the length of service, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to 26 months’ notice – equivalent to damages of $124,484.04.

Thus, Keenan emphasizes that whether or not a worker primarily works for a single client is a critical factor when it comes to determining whether a worker is entitled to reasonable notice from that client.  Even if other factors indicate independent contractor status, if the worker is mostly working for one client then termination without reasonable notice may come with a heavy price.

[1] Keenan v. Canac Kitchens, 2015 ONSC 1055 (“Keenan”) at para. 20

[2] Ibid, see also Khan v. All-Can Express Ltd. 2014 BCSC 1429

[3] Keenan, supra note 1

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Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment | ...
Lana Li
Thursday, May 21st, 2015    Posted by Lana Li (posts)

Under the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 (the “FLA”) unless property is “excluded property”, property owned by at least one spouse upon separation is family property and presumptively to be equally divided.  “Excluded property” includes property which is owned by one of the spouses before the relationship began, inheritances to a spouse and gifts to a spouse from a third party (s. 85(1) of the FLA).

In VJR v SKW, 2015 BCSC 593, a husband successfully argued that a $2 million payment to him was a gift, by way of inheritance, from his former employer, with whom he had developed a father-son relationship.  However, upon receiving the $2 million payment, the husband then used the funds to purchase property registered in his wife’s name only and to pay off family debts.  The husband argued that he had just placed the property in the wife’s name to protect him and his family from his creditors and that the wife held the entire property in trust for him.  The wife argued that the husband had gifted the money to her based upon how the property was registered and his use of the money to pay family debt.  The Court held that the husband could not argue that the registration of the property to the wife was to shield him from his creditors and then argue the property was held in trust for him.  The Court would not assist a sham arrangement and help the husband to establish a trust arrangement for his benefit.  It determined that the husband had gifted the property to the wife, such that it was found to be family property, and the net sale proceeds were divided equally between them.  Even if the $2 million payment was “excluded property”, it was significantly unfair not to divide it with the wife as she had contributed to the property, the household, and she had supported the husband for over 10 years, which helped him to develop his relationship with his former employer.

Therefore, if property is “excluded property”, it is best to keep it separate, such as putting the money in a separate bank account, and not use it to purchase family property or pay down family debt.

Alisha Parmar
Monday, April 27th, 2015    Posted by Alisha Parmar (posts) and Shafik Bhalloo (posts)
Alisha Parmar
Alisha joined Kornfeld LLP as an associate in 2015 after completing her articles with the firm.
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.

The Potter Decision – When an Administrative Suspension Goes Too Far


By Alisha Parmar and Shafik Bhalloo


The Potter Decision – When an Administrative Suspension Goes Too Far

Constructive dismissal is a fascinating concept for employment lawyers, employees, and employers alike.   When an employer is found to have “constructively dismissed” an employee, it means that the law characterizes the employer’s conduct as amounting to dismissal.  Whether or not the employer intended to dismiss the employee, a finding of constructive dismissal can have significant consequences – an offending employer will be liable for damages in lieu of the notice that ought to have been provided to the employee when she was dismissed.   Thus, it seems all the more important that the law governing this legal creature be well-defined, lest an unwitting employer accidently “dismiss” an employee. 

In Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10 (“Potter”), the Supreme Court of Canada recently provided an in-depth examination of how the test for constructive dismissal is to be applied and the rules of evidence for each branch of the test.  Further, in the context of administrative suspensions, the decision explicitly recognizes that an employer must provide legitimate business reasons for suspending an employee – otherwise the employer might be constructively dismissing the employee.

As background, an administrative suspension is the broad ability of an employer to temporarily discontinue an employee’s work in a non-union workplace for administrative reasons.[1] This stands in contrast to a suspension for disciplinary reasons.  Further, in this case, the administrative suspension was not for administrative reasons unrelated to the employee’s conduct.  To clarify, the reason for an administrative suspension may be that there is an economic downturn or something else unrelated to the employee – this was not the case in Potter.[2]

The Two Branches of the Legal Test for Constructive Dismissal

Previously, in Farber v. Royal Trust Co., [1997] 1 SCR 846 (“Farber”), the Supreme Court of Canada had held that:

A constructive dismissal occurs where an employer makes a unilateral and fundamental change to a term or condition of the employment contract without providing reasonable notice of that change to the employee.[3]

In Potter the Court further recognized that there are two branches of the test for constructive dismissal.  First, the employee may demonstrate that the employer breached an express or implied term of the contract and then show that the breach was serious enough to constitute constructive dismissal.[4]  The majority explained that a sufficiently serious breach is one which “substantially alters an essential term of the contract” or evinces an intention on the part of the employer to no longer be bound by the contract.[5]  As explained in Farber, this involves asking the question whether a reasonable person in the same situation as the employee would feel that the essential terms of the contract were altered.[6]

Under the second branch, the employee may prove more generally that the employer intended not to be bound by the employment contract, even without showing that there was a breach of a specific term.[7]  This branch takes a retrospective look at whether the employer’s cumulative past acts evince an intention to no longer be bound by the contract.[8]  The question under this branch is whether a reasonable person in the position of the employee, in light of all the circumstances, would conclude that the employer no longer intended to be bound by the contract.[9]

Constructive Dismissal in the context of an Administrative Suspension

Notably, the majority explained that under the first branch in the case of an administrative suspension, the burden shifts to the employer to show that a breach of the employment contract has not occurred.[10]  In order to do this, the employer must show that there were legitimate business reasons for the suspension:

In my view, legitimate business reasons constitute a requirement for a finding that an administrative suspension based on an implied authority to suspend is not wrongful.  Other than in the context of a disciplinary suspension, an employer does not, as a matter of law, have an implied authority to suspend an employee without such reasons.  Legitimate business reasons must always be shown, although the nature or the importance of those reasons will vary with the circumstances of the suspension.[11]

Thus, without legitimate business reasons for the administrative suspension, the employer fails the first part of the test, and the analysis moves onto whether the unauthorized suspension constitutes a substantial breach.  This involves considering whether a reasonable person in the employee’s circumstances would have perceived, inter alia, that the employer was acting in good faith to protect a legitimate business interest, and that the employer’s act had a minimal impact on her in terms of the duration of the suspension.[12]

Application to the Facts

In Potter, the plaintiff employee was appointed the Executive Director of the New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission for a seven year term.  About half-way into the term, the plaintiff and the defendant began negotiating for a buyout of the plaintiff’s employment contract.  However, prior to the conclusion of these negotiations, the plaintiff delegated his responsibilities to another director and went on medical leave.

Following this, the defendant unilaterally decided to put a deadline on the buyout negotiations.  If the negotiations were not resolved prior to a certain date, the defendant’s plan was to make a request to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to revoke the plaintiff’s appointment for cause.  A week before the plaintiff was scheduled to return from medical leave and unbeknownst to the plaintiff, a letter was sent to the Minister of Justice by a representative of the defendant requesting that he be dismissed for cause.  On the same day, the defendant’s solicitor sent the plaintiff’s solicitor a letter which effectively placed the plaintiff on an indefinite administrative suspension without any explanation, but with pay.  Meanwhile, the defendant designated a replacement for the plaintiff.  Two months after being suspended, the plaintiff commenced an action for constructive dismissal.  The defendant contended that by commencing the action the plaintiff had voluntarily resigned, and stopped paying his salary and benefits.

The majority analyzed the facts in Potter using the first branch of the test for constructive dismissal and held that the defendant had in fact constructively dismissed the plaintiff. 

Under the first step, the majority found the defendant did not have express or implied authority to suspend the plaintiff.  The reasons for this finding included the fact that the suspension was of indefinite duration, the defendant had failed to act in good faith, and that it had concealed the intention to have the plaintiff’s employment terminated.[13]  The majority pointed out that as the analysis under this step was conducted from an objective point of view, it was appropriate to consider the letter sent on behalf of the defendant to the Minister of Justice requesting the plaintiff’s dismissal.

The majority further accepted, under the second step, that a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff would view the breach as substantial, despite the fact the defendant continued to pay the plaintiff.  The defendant had a duty to provide the plaintiff with work, and moreover the suspension was neither reasonable nor justified, since inter alia, no reasons were provided to the plaintiff.[14]  However, the majority emphasized that at this point in the test, it was not appropriate to consider the letter requesting the plaintiff’s dismissal, because it was completely outside the realm of the plaintiff’s knowledge at the time.[15]


There a number of important takeaways in this decision:

  1. Acting within the confines of the employment contract:  Where an action is not expressly authorized by the employment contract, a careful analysis should be conducted as to whether the action is impliedly authorized or consented to by the employee – if not, the employer runs the risk of having constructively dismissed the employee.
  2. Legitimate business reasons:  Employers do not have the implied authority to place an employee on non-disciplinary administrative suspension without legitimate business reasons.  If the employer desires to have this ability, it should be provided in the contract.
  3. Continuing to pay is insufficient:  There is a duty for employers to continue to provide work.  When this duty is interfered with, continuing to pay the employee may be insufficient to show that the employee was not constructively dismissed.

[1] Potter v. New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission, 2015 SCC 10 (“Potter”) at para. 68

[2] Ibid at paras. 69 -70

[3] Farber v. Royal Trust Co., [1997] 1 SCR 846 (“Farber”) at para. 34

[4] Potter, supra note 1 at para. 32

[5] Ibid at para. 34 to 35

[6] Ibid at para. 26

[7] Ibid at para. 33

[8] Ibid at para. 33

[9] Ibid at para. 42

[10] Ibid at para. 41

[11] Ibid at para. 98

[12] Ibid at para. 45

[13] Ibid at para. 46

[14] Ibid at para. 81, 99

[15] Ibid at para. 63

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Posted by Alisha Parmar (posts) and Shafik Bhalloo (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment | ...