This is the fourth and final post in a series of posts on this subject. The full version of the article was published by the Institute of Corporate Directors in its Journal and and as a web resource.
Bad Faith and Self-Dealing
I would not allow corporations to exonerate directors in the event of bad faith, self-dealing or other instances of non-loyalty.
In the event the directors’ action is challenged, it will be the court’s job to determine whether the board’s decision was in fact taken disloyally. This may involve review of the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bound of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith. Delaware law shows that the courts are capable of making a reasoned distinction.
In the event of a conflict of interest, directors’ approval of a transaction can be set aside even where it had been subsequently approved by the shareholders after the conflicts of interest were disclosed. Directors in such a case would be obliged to prove that the shareholders were fully informed and that the process was transparent in all respects.
As discussed in the Delaware Disney litigation involving its former president, Michael Ovitz, a “failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”
A good example of a gross negligence claim without a bad faith component is seen in the proposed sale of the Lear Corporation: Lear Corporate Shareholder Litigation. A deal was struck with a potential suitor under which he would increase his offer by some $90,000,000 on the condition that the company pay him a $25,000,000 termination fee if the shareholders voted “no”. After the deal was rejected and the termination fee was paid, the plaintiffs alleged that the transaction was entered into in bad faith in that it had been a virtual certainty that the offer would be rejected by shareholders. The Court once against struck the lawsuit because there were no facts indicating that the directors consciously acted in a manner contrary to the interests of Lear and its stockholders.
