Archive for the ‘Labour & Employment’ Category

Shafik Bhalloo
Monday, September 29th, 2014    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Alisha Parmar (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.
Alisha Parmar
Alisha comes to Kornfeld LLP from University of British Columbia as an Articling Student. Her primary area of interest lies in: general corporate commercial law.



In today’s workplace, privacy is an evolving issue and Canadian privacy law is developing rapidly. Perhaps surprisingly, only a handful of Canadian jurisdictions, (including British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Newfoundland) have privacy legislation that creates a statutory tort or civil right of action for invasion of privacy. Until recently, most Canadian jurisdictions could only rely on legislative schemes that applied in very specific contexts – there was no general remedy for an invasion of privacy, unless the claimant managed to successfully establish the existence of a common law right to bring a civil action.

That changed when the common law tort of invasion of privacy was given teeth by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32 (“Jones”), wherein the Court definitively recognized the common law cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion. In Jones, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion enabled the plaintiff to recover not insignificant damages for the invasion of her privacy where no legislative scheme applied and where she had suffered no pecuniary loss.

But the bite of Jones and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion do not stop there. This year, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice relied on Jones to certify a class action proceeding against an employer for, inter alia, vicarious liability of an employee’s tort of intrusion upon seclusion. While the case, Evans v The Bank of Nova Scotia, 2014 ONSC 2135 (“Evans”), has yet to proceed to trial, the decision is one to watch out for. Whether or not the employer is ultimately found liable for the employee’s breach of privacy, Evans serves as a reminder that the law around breach of privacy is progressing swiftly and that employers must keep up.


The Facts

The plaintiff, Ms. Jones, and the defendant, Ms. Tsige, were both employees of the Bank of Montreal (“BMO”). Another coincidental common factor was that Ms. Jones’ former husband had formed a common law relationship with Ms. Tsige. However, Ms. Jones and Ms. Tsige did not know each other, and they worked at different branches of the BMO in different positions.

By virtue of her position with the BMO, Ms. Tsige had access to Ms. Jones’ personal information, and on at least 174 occasions, using her computer at her workplace, Ms. Tsige did in fact access Ms. Jones personal information. The information included Ms. Jones’ date of birth, marital status, language spoken, residential address, and details of her financial transactions in her personal accounts with the BMO.

The BMO discovered Ms. Tsige’s activities and confronted her. Ms. Tsige admitted to the BMO that she had no legitimate reason for accessing Ms. Jones’ personal information. Instead, Ms. Tsige explained she had been accessing Ms. Jones’ information since she was in a financial dispute with her common law spouse (Ms. Jones’ former husband) and wanted to find out if he was paying Ms. Jones child support. Notably, Ms. Tsige did not make any copies of or disseminate Ms. Jones’ personal information.

The BMO disciplined Ms. Tsige by meting out a five-day suspension and denying her a yearly bonus. The BMO also issued her a warning that future repetition of her conduct would result in termination of her employment. Ms. Tsige was asked to review and discuss the BMO privacy principles and standards.

The Ontario Superior Court

Ms. Jones lodged an action in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice asserting that her privacy interest in her confidential banking information was “irreversibly destroyed” and claimed damages of $70,000 for invasion of privacy and breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive and exemplary damages of $20,000 against Ms. Tsige.

The Court held there was no fiduciary duty owed by Ms. Tsige to Ms. Jones and dismissed the breach of fiduciary duty claim, finding there was no fiduciary relationship between them in the traditional or non-traditional sense.

With respect to the invasion of privacy claim, the Court rejected the notion that in Ontario a common law tort of invasion of privacy exists. As a result, the privacy claim was also dismissed. The Court stated that in spite of the dismissal, Ms. Jones was not without remedy because she could bring an action for invasion of privacy under the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 c. 5 (“PIPEDA”).

The Ontario Court of Appeal

Ms. Jones appealed the Superior Court’s ruling to the Ontario Court of Appeal only on the ground that Ontario law does not recognize the tort of invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeal reversed the lower Court’s decision, recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, and awarded Ms. Jones damages.

In order to come to the conclusion that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion exists in Ontario, the Court of Appeal conducted an extensive review of Canadian, American, and English jurisprudence on the tort of invasion of privacy. The Court found the comments of Professor Prosser particularly compelling, and stated that if Ms. Jones did have a cause of action for the invasion of her privacy, it would fall in Professor Prosser’s first category of invasion of privacy, namely intrusion upon seclusion.[1]

For her case, Ms. Tsige submitted that the existing Ontario and federal legislative framework addressing privacy is an adequate basis for the Court to refuse to recognize the emerging tort of intrusion upon seclusion. To that end, Ms. Tsige argued that expansion of the law in the area should be left to Parliament and the legislature.

The Court of Appeal considered and rejected this argument, pointing out the various deficiencies in the legislative framework with respect to Ms. Jones’ case. Namely, the legislation that Ms. Jones could use, PIPEDA, only deals with “organizations” that are within federal jurisdiction and does not address the existence of a civil cause of action for invasion of privacy within provincial jurisdiction. In addition, Ms. Jones would only be able to use PIPEDA to lodge an action against the BMO, not Ms. Tsige, and the statute would not permit her to recover damages. Further, the Court of Appeal identified that existing Ontario legislation does not provide for a private cause of action between individuals; it merely addresses individual privacy rights in the context of governmental and other public institutions.

The Court of Appeal then confirmed the existence of a right of action for intrusion upon seclusion, reasoning as follows:

Recognition of such a cause of action would amount to an incremental step that is consistent with the role of this court to develop the common law in a manner consistent with the changing needs of society.

For over one hundred years, technological change has motivated the legal protection of the individual’s right to privacy. In modern times, the pace of technological change has accelerated exponentially…

It is within the capacity of the common law to evolve to respond to the problem posed by the routine collection and aggregation of highly personal information that is readily accessible in electronic form. Technological change poses a novel threat to a right of privacy that has been protected for hundreds of years by the common law under various guises and that, since 1982 and the Charter, has been recognized as a right that is integral to our social and political order.

The Legal Elements of Intrusion upon Seclusion

The Ontario Court of Appeal expressly adopted the key features of intrusion upon seclusion as delineated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (2010). The legal elements are that:

  1. The defendant’s conduct must be intentional, which includes reckless conduct;
  2. The defendant must have invaded, without lawful justification, the plaintiff’s private affairs or concerns; and
  3. A reasonable person would regard the invasion as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation, or anguish.

The Court of Appeal opined that recognizing intrusion upon seclusion as a cause of action does not pose a serious risk of opening the proverbial “floodgates”. The Court stated only “deliberate and significant invasions of personal privacy” are caught by the tort and not de minimus cases:

Claims from individuals who are sensitive or unusually concerned about their privacy are excluded: it is only intrusions into matters such as one’s financial or health records, sexual practices and orientation, employment, diary or private correspondence that, viewed objectively on the reasonable person standard, can be described as highly offensive.

Nonetheless, the Court indicated that a plaintiff is not required to establish actual loss or damages as part of the cause of action. In this respect, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is similar to the statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy which exist under the legislative schemes implemented in the four provinces, including British Columbia.

Having said this, the Court stated that where the plaintiff has suffered no pecuniary loss, only “symbolic” or “moral” damages are appropriate to acknowledge the wrong done. After considering Ontario case law and the Manitoba Privacy Act, the Court of Appeal established the upper range for damages where no pecuniary loss is suffered at $20,000. The Court then awarded Ms. Jones $10,000, the mid-point of the range, stating that Ms. Tsige’s conduct was “highly offensive to the reasonable person and caused humiliation, distress and anguish”, but that it did not qualify as “exceptional circumstances” meriting an award of punitive or exemplary damages – those awards were to be left for “truly exceptional circumstances”.


The Facts

Evans also involves another major bank, the Bank of Nova Scotia (“BNS”), where an employee illegitimately accessed customer information. The employee, Mr. Wilson was a mortgage administration officer for the BNS, and as such had access to highly confidential customer information.

Over the course of approximately one year, Mr. Wilson accessed the files of 643 customers of the BNS and forwarded private information to his girlfriend. His girlfriend then distributed the information to individuals who used it to commit identity theft and other fraud. Unlike Jones, it was law enforcement and not the bank that uncovered the scheme. The arrangement and Mr. Wilson’s involvement was exposed by the Calgary Police in the course of executing a search warrant against individuals who were attempting to use the information to perpetrate fraud in Alberta. Mr. Wilson was confronted and confessed to improperly printing and accessing customer profiles for individuals who had applied for mortgages.

The BNS gave notice to the 643 individuals whose profiles had been accessed by Mr. Wilson (the “Notice Group”). Over 130 individuals from the Notice Group have since informed the BNS that they have been victims of identity theft or fraud. The BNS compensated those individuals for their financial losses and offered each individual in the Notice Group a complimentary subscription to credit monitoring and identity-theft protection service.

In spite of these efforts, the BNS, in addition to Mr. Wilson, was named as a defendant in a class action, with the class being the entire Notice Group. The Ontario Superior Court certified the Notice Group’s class action for, inter alia, the BNS’ vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion.

Vicarious Liability and Intrusion Upon Seclusion

The Ontario Superior Court relied on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision Bazley v Curry, [1999] SCR 534 (“Bazley”) for the rationale to impose vicarious liability on an employer. In Bazley, McLaughlin J (as she then was) stated:

The fundamental question is whether the wrongful act is sufficiently related to conduct authorized by the employer to justify the imposition of vicarious liability…

In determining the sufficiency of the connection between the employer’s creation or enhancement of the risk and the wrong complained of, subsidiary factors may be considered. These may vary with the nature of the case. When related to intentional torts, the relevant factors may include, but are not limited to, the following:

    1.  the opportunity that the enterprise afforded the employee to abuse his or her power;
    2.  the extent to which the wrongful act may have furthered the employer’s aims (and hence be more likely to have been committed by the employee);
    3.  the extent to which the wrongful act was related to friction, confrontation or intimacy inherent in the employer’s enterprise;
    4.  the extent of power conferred on the employee in relation to the victim;
    5.  the vulnerability of potential victims to wrongful exercise of the employee’s power.

[Emphasis in original]

The Ontario Superior Court further specified that “vicarious liability ‘is strict, and does not require any misconduct on the part of the person who is subject to it’: Straus Estate v Decaire, 2011 ONSC 1157, 84 C.C.L.T. (3d) 141 at para. 49.”

Applying this legal test to the conduct of the BNS, the Court found that, at least to the extent required to certify the class action, the BNS had enabled Mr. Wilson to commit the tort of intrusion upon seclusion:

[BNS] created the opportunity for Wilson to abuse his power by allowing him to have unsupervised access to customer’s private information without installing any monitoring system… Wilson was given complete power in relation to the victims’ (customers) confidential information, because of his unsupervised access to their confidential information. Bank customers are entirely vulnerable to an employee releasing their confidential information. Finally, there is a significant connection between the risk created by the employer in this situation and the wrongful conduct of the employee.

Furthermore, the Court’s decision to certify the class action for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion was not influenced by the BNS’ admission of responsibility to compensate the Notice Group for any financial losses. The BNS submitted that it accepted liability for the pecuniary losses of the individuals, as evidenced by the BNS’ willingness to financially compensate the members of the Notice Group that came forward as being victims of fraud. The Court refused to accept the BNS’ argument that it was not liable for further damages through vicarious liability for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Conversely, the Court distinguished the two types of damages and stated that the BNS’ “admission of responsibility to pay for the pecuniary damages suffered is a different situation from the absence of claim for compensatory damages”.


Jones and Evans raise a number of thought-provoking issues for employers to consider, and the ramifications of the two cases extend well beyond Ontario.

Though it has yet to proceed to trial, Evans clearly brings to light the necessity of employers to keep up with the demands of privacy law. Employers who are neglectful in this regard may be held liable for not only the pecuniary damages associated with illegitimate access or use of private information, but also the moral or compensatory damages that may flow from a successful claim of vicariously liability for intrusion upon seclusion or applicable statutory causes of action for invasion of privacy.

In an increasingly technological world, employers have the responsibility to adequately supervise employees in their access to confidential or private information when such access is granted by virtue of employment. To this end, employers should have up-to-date privacy policies in place and ensure that employees are aware of what constitutes unauthorized access or use of private information. Employers should take active measures to ensure that these policies are implemented and followed, and it is recommended that the policies include mechanisms to monitor employee access to private information in order to identify potential abuse. Being proactive and having effective policies in place may assist employers in decreasing liability in the event that a claim of vicarious liability for an invasion of privacy is brought against the employer, or, in any event, may reduce the number and severity of potential claims by exposing unauthorized access sooner rather than later.

In addition, while the courts in British Columbia are not bound by the decisions of Ontario courts, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Jones and that of the Ontario Superior Court in Evans may still be relied upon as persuasive authority. In particular, the two decisions may be used to delineate the scope of privacy protection afforded in other jurisdictions, including provinces with general privacy legislation, since “privacy” is not defined in the statutes.

Moreover, Jones is a well-reasoned decision with an extensive overview of the relevant jurisprudence, legislation and authoritative academic literature on the tort of invasion of privacy. The Ontario Court of Appeal took judicial notice of the role of technological change and the growing threat it poses for privacy, making a highly persuasive case for other courts to “develop the common law in a manner consistent with changing society”.

Finally, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion may affect individuals outside of Ontario even before a decision is made to import the new cause of action to other jurisdictions. The Notice Group in Evans includes individuals who are residents of British Columbia and New Brunswick. The BNS attempted to argue that as against those 35 individuals, the claim of vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion could not disclose a reasonable cause of action, since the two jurisdictions have not yet recognized the tort.

The Ontario Superior Court chose not to preclude these individuals from utilizing the cause of action and instead commented that “[w]hile the Courts in British Columbia and New Brunswick have not as of yet recognized the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, I was not given caselaw to suggest that they have definitively shut the door on this cause of action.” In the end, the courts of British Columbia may decide to open the door to intrusion upon seclusion, and employers should be prepared for if, and when, they do.

[1] William Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed. (West Publishing Company, 1971) at p. 389:

  1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs.
  2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.
  3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.
  4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.


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Shafik Bhalloo
Tuesday, April 29th, 2014    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Devin Lucas (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.
Devin Lucas
Devin Lucas maintains a general civil litigation practice with a focus on corporate and commercial litigation and landlord tenant and real property disputes. His commercial litigation experience includes contractual disputes, employment matters, and debtor-creditor law.


The steps to receiving a suspension when appealing a determination of the Director of Employment Standards (the “Director”) to the Employment Standards Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) can be confusing and full of potholes, so it is best to plan ahead and know the terrain.  For applicants wanting to map out their route, this article will provide a brief primer of the law governing a suspension request when appealing a determination by the Director.  It will also serve as a practical guide for adjudicators who are reviewing these applications.  Part I examines the statutory scheme behind this remedy.  Part II documents a number of previous decisions where suspensions have been ordered and where they have been refused, as well as decisions regarding reconsideration of appeals and suspension orders rendered moot.  Part III sets out five common errors made by applicants and seven instructive principles for consideration by both applicants and adjudicators.


Section 113 of the Employment Standards Act (the “Act”) and Rule 31 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”) govern requests to suspend a Director’s determination.  The two provisions are complementary and should be viewed collectively by an applicant seeking a suspension of a determination:

Director’s determination may be suspended


(1)        A person who appeals a determination may request the tribunal to suspend the effect of the determination.

(2)        The tribunal may suspend the determination for the period and subject to the conditions it thinks appropriate, but only if the person who requests the  suspension deposits with the director either

(a)        the total amount, if any, required to be paid under the determination, or

(b)        a smaller amount that the tribunal considers adequate in the circumstances of the appeal.

Rule 31           Request to Suspend a Determination

Requirements for application to suspend a determination

(1)        In order to request a suspension under s. 113 of the Act an appellant or applicant must, in writing, at the same time as filing the appeal or application for reconsideration:

(a)        state the reasons for the request to suspend the determination;

(b)        state the amount to be deposited with the Director; and

(c)        if that amount is less than the amount required to be paid by the Director, state the reasons why depositing a lesser amount would be adequate in the circumstances.

Notice of suspension request

(2)        The Tribunal may notify the other parties of the request to suspend the determination and set a time limit for responding to the request.

Suspension decision

(3)        If the request is not otherwise resolved, the Tribunal will advise the parties in writing of its decision on the request.

Section 113(1) of the Act grants an applicant appealing a determination the ability to seek a suspension of a determination pending an appeal; subsection (2) gives the Tribunal the authority to consider such an application.  The language of subsection (2) is permissive and vests in the Tribunal the sole discretion to grant a suspension.  As such, a suspension is not granted by the Tribunal as a matter of course.  Further, respondents are given the opportunity to file submissions in response to an applicant’s suspension request.

Subsection (2) holds that the Tribunal is to exercise its discretion to suspend a determination subject to terms and conditions considered sufficient by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal has the option of ordering either the total amount, if any, required to be paid under the determination to be deposited with the Director, or a smaller amount that the Tribunal considers appropriate in the circumstances of the appeal.  The amount is held in trust by the Director pending a further order by the Tribunal on the merits of the appeal.

Rule 31(1) goes further and explains the procedural requirements governing a suspension request.  It requires the applicant to submit in writing, “at the same time as filing the appeal or application for reconsideration”, the reasons for the request to suspend the determination, the amount the applicant is willing to deposit with the Director, and if that amount is less than the full amount ordered by the Director in the determination then the reasons why the lesser amount would be adequate in the circumstances.

It is important to note that an applicant is only permitted to request the Tribunal to suspend a determination that was issued pursuant to section 79 of the Act.  Section 113 does not apply in respect of a determination issued under section 119.  Section 119 deals with reciprocating jurisdictions under the Act and allows an employee in a reciprocating jurisdiction to have an order from that jurisdiction enforced in British Columbia.  Pursuant to section 119, a determination can be appealed, but only to the Supreme Court of British Columbia and not to the Tribunal.  Accordingly, only the Supreme Court of British Columbia has the authority to suspend a section 119 determination.


Numerous Tribunal decisions have considered section 113 applications.  The practice that has emerged recently with respect to these decisions is for the Tribunal to issue its reasons on an application to suspend the effect of a determination separately from the reasons regarding the actual merits of an applicant’s appeal.

A.        Suspensions Ordered

The 1997 Tribunal ruling in Tricom Services Inc.[1] is a leading decision on the factors that a Tribunal must evaluate when considering a suspension of a determination request.  In that decision, a security business appealed a determination by the Director, whereby the employer was ordered to pay the total sum of $34,076.82 representing unpaid wages and interest.  The employer, Tricom Services Inc. (“Tricom”), also sought a suspension of the determination pending the outcome of the appeal.

The Tribunal released an initial decision regarding the employer’s request to suspend the determination.  The Director strenuously objected to the suspension request because the company was in a financially precarious position.  The Director raised the concern that if the determination was suspended without any monetary deposit the employees would be severely financially prejudiced.  In response, the employer stated that although it was able to pay the full amount of the determination, such payment would have a significant negative effect on its cash flow and, on the basis of its strong meritorious appeal, the suspension ought to be ordered with no, or very little, money being deposited.

In its preliminary decision on the suspension request, the Tribunal made reference to two earlier Tribunal decisions.  First, the Tribunal distinguished Motion Works Group Ltd.[2], where the Tribunal ordered the suspension of a determination (in the amount of $16,039.58) upon deposit of the sum of $5,000.  In Motion Works Group Ltd., the Tribunal issued an order suspending the determination primarily for the reason that the determination appeared to overstate the unpaid wage entitlement of the employees.  The Tribunal, in Tricom, noted that, unlike the case at bar, the allegation had been particularized in Motion Works Group Ltd.  In that regard, the Tribunal stated:

… Tricom simply makes a general assertion that the Determination may be in error as to the calculation of the amounts due to the various employees.  However, given that the Determination was based on Tricom’s own payroll records, I would have thought it not a Herculean task for the appellant to more fully particularize its claim that the Determination contains calculation errors.

Despite the lack of particularity regarding the Director’s apparent overstatement of wages, the Tribunal was satisfied that the employer’s appeal may be meritorious.  The Tribunal went on to consider the Tribunal decision in TNL Paving Ltd. et al.[3]  In TNL Paving Ltd. et al., the Director had opposed a suspension request on the basis that if the determination was suspended, an ongoing investigation would be prejudiced.  The Director had issued a determination that the records pursuant to an earlier Demand by the Director could be utilized in an investigation into whether the employers had complied with its statutory obligations.  This was a unique case as the determination did not involve a monetary order.  The Director, in response to the applicant’s request, had opposed it as it submitted only determinations for a specific monetary sum could be suspended.  The Tribunal noted that section 113(2)(a) referred to depositing with the Director the “total amount, if any…”.  In the Tribunal’s opinion, the words “if any” specifically contemplated an applicant seeking a suspension of a determination that did not involve the payment of money.  Further, the Tribunal found that the Director’s submission that it would be prejudiced if a suspension was granted failed for lack of particularity.  The Director had not established how it would be prejudiced if the determination were to be suspended.

Similarly, the Tribunal in Tricom Services Inc.[4] found that the general claim of prejudice on the part of the employer regarding its cash flow was insufficient to justify an order to suspend the determination upon deposit of little or no monetary security.  According to the Tribunal, the adequacy of any proposed deposit must be viewed not only from the perspective of the employer, but from the point of view of the employees as well, as their rights could be affected by a suspension order.  The Tribunal took into account the fact that Tricom appeared to be having financial difficulties and there was a risk that the employees would not be able to recover their unpaid wages. The Tribunal ordered that the determination be suspended until the appeal had been heard or decided, or until further order of the Tribunal, on the condition that Tricom deposited with the Director the full amount of $34,076.82 required to be paid under the determination.

The Tribunal in Miller[5] provided a useful summary of the governing principles in a section 113 application.  In this decision, the Tribunal Member approved of a two-stage analysis for adjudicators considering section 113 suspension applications.  First, the Tribunal should determine whether it should suspend the determination.  If the Tribunal decides that a suspension is warranted, it should then contemplate what terms and conditions are appropriate in the circumstances.  In considering whether it should suspend the determination, the Tribunal should consider whether the grounds of appeal appear to raise a “justifiable issue” based on any of the three statutory grounds of appeal.  Moreover, at this stage, the Tribunal ought to consider whether the applicant will likely endure unreasonable financial hardship if a suspension order is not granted and whether one or more of the respondent parties will be unjustly prejudiced if a suspension order is granted.  If the Tribunal is satisfied that a suspension order is justified, the “default” order is that the full amount of the determination be paid into trust with the Director pending the outcome of the appeal.  If, however, the applicant seeks an order that a lesser sum be deposited, the applicant must establish why that would be appropriate taking into account all the relevant circumstances.

The Tribunal Member recognized that an appeal from a decision of the Director does not grant a right to the applicant for a fresh trial.  On this basis, he advised that the Tribunal should not suspend a determination if the applicant’s appeal documents fail to raise, on their face, an arguable case that the appeal might succeed on one or more of the enumerated grounds of appeal pursuant to section 112 of the Act.  As such, the Tribunal Member warned that a general claim that the Director failed to observe the principles of natural justice in making the determination will not be adequate.  The Tribunal Member identified that the applicant is the party that bears the burden of satisfying the Tribunal, on a balance of probabilities, that a suspension order is warranted.

In light of these principles, the Tribunal found in Miller[6] that the applicant raised an arguable case, but had failed to provide any support for its contention that the award would raise undue financial hardship.  Therefore, the Tribunal Member ordered that the suspension order should be granted provided the appellant deposit the full sum required to be paid under the determination.

The Tribunal in Kootenai Community Centre Society[7] was asked to consider a request for suspension of a determination requiring a non-profit society to pay $18,171.74, representing wages and accrued interest owed to a former employee and an administrative penalty in the amount of $500.00.  The society deposited the amount of $7,359.75 with the Director in its appeal.  This amount reflected what the society submitted was the employee’s entitlement less statutory deductions.  The society also gave an undertaking to pay out the outstanding balance of the award, if necessary, following the Tribunal’s decision on the merits.  The Tribunal found that the society’s submissions regarding the substantive aspects of the appeal had merit.   Further, the Tribunal considered the fact that neither of the respondents had taken a position with respect to the suspension application and found that the granting of the suspension would not be prejudicial towards these parties.   In the end, the Tribunal concluded that a suspension order was warranted and that the lesser amount was sufficient to act as security pending the outcome of the appeal.

In many section 113 suspension application decisions, the Tribunal takes a middle of the road stance that seeks to balance the competing interests of the applicant and the respondent.  This was illustrated in the Tribunal decision of Wen-DI[8], in which the Tribunal fashioned a creative remedy that sought to satisfy the interests of both the applicant and the respondent.  In that case, the applicant employer requested that the determination ordering the applicant to pay $10,451.36 be suspended upon the deposit of $1,200 with the Director pending the appeal.   The applicant raised the issue of potential cash flow problems. In response, the Director submitted that the full amount ought to be deposited.  The Tribunal felt neither proposal was appropriate.  The Tribunal framed an order that secured the employee’s claim while, at the same, did not unduly constrain the employer’s cash flow.  The Tribunal accomplished this by ordering the applicant to provide to the Director an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of the Director for the full amount ordered to be paid under the determination.

In Chatzispiros[9], the Director issued a determination against a number of related companies, including 553334 B.C. Ltd., for $435,905.05 on account of unpaid regular wages, statutory holiday pay, vacation pay, individual compensation for length of service and group termination pay owed to 64 former employees of an intermediate care facility.  A subsequent determination was issued against Kosta Chatzispiros, in the amount of $121,253.56, in his capacity as a director and officer of 553334 B.C. Ltd.  In his suspension request, Mr. Chatzispiros claimed that if he was required to pay the full amount of the determination, he would be forced to file for bankruptcy.  According to Mr. Chatzispiros, a deposit of $1,000 would be suitable in the circumstances of the appeal.  The Director took the position that 10 percent of the determination would be an adequate, being $12,125.  The Tribunal agreed with the Director’s proposal given the fact that $1,000 was inadequate security for the 64 complainant employees, the lack of merit of Mr. Chatzispiros’s appeal, and that it appeared the applicant had no intention of paying the determination amount should it be upheld on appeal.  As such, the Director ordered that the determination be suspended provided the applicant deposited $12,125 with the Director.

In Holt[10], William Holt was found personally liable for two months of unpaid wages, in the total amount of $11,786.67.  The Director had found that Mr. Holt, as a director or officer of a software company, had breached the Act by failing to pay regular wages to a former employee.  Mr. Holt appealed the determination and requested a suspension of the determination.  Counsel for Mr. Holt submitted that Mr. Holt was retired and requiring a deposit of any amount would cause a considerable hardship to the applicant.  The Tribunal found that Mr. Holt had made out an arguable case, and that his appeal had some merit.  On this basis, the Tribunal suspended the effect of the determination.  Because of the fact that Mr. Holt was retired, the Tribunal considered it appropriate that the entire amount be suspended pending the result of the appeal.

B.        Suspensions Refused

In the Tribunal decision in RTS[11], an employer requested a suspension of the effect of a determination, in the amount of $4,346.78, pending the outcome of a hearing and a final decision made by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal quoted with approval a passage from the leading decision of Tricom Services Inc.[12], where the Tribunal stated:

… it is important to note that the legislature has provided, as a first proposition, that a suspension should only be ordered if the ‘total amount’ of the determination is posted; a ‘smaller amount’ should only be ordered if such lesser amount would be ‘adequate in the circumstances of the appeal’.

The Tribunal Member noted that there was not any indication in the appeal that the employer deposited any amount with the Director that was required to be paid pursuant to the determination.  Without some indication that that this condition has been fulfilled, or that the Tribunal approved of a lesser amount being deposited, the Tribunal was not prepared to exercise its discretion under section 113 and issue a suspension of determination.

In Strauss[13], an employee filed a complaint pursuant to section 74 of the Act based on the allegation that her employer, Strauss Herb Company, had failed to pay her annual vacation pay, statutory holiday pay and compensation for length of service.  The employee was ultimately successful and was awarded vacation pay, statutory holiday pay, and compensation for length of service.  Further, the employer was ordered to pay interest and three administrative penalties.  The company subsequently appealed on the basis that the Director failed to observe the principles of natural justice in making the determination and also requested that the Tribunal suspend the determination.  Contrary to the principles espoused in Miller[14], the applicant failed to provide an arguable case for the appeal on its merits, and instead relied on a bare allegation that the Director had failed to comply with the principles of natural justice in making its determination.  Moreover, the applicant did not provide any written submissions in support of its suspension request, nor deposit any amount with the Director.  Given that the applicant had the onus of establishing the basis for suspension, the Tribunal quite rightly refused suspension.  The Tribunal Member stated that “it is not for the Tribunal to divine the basis of an applicant’s suspension application.  The onus is clearly on the applicant to persuade the Tribunal on a balance of probabilities, the merits of its suspension request.”

The decision in Golden Crown[15], underscores the confusion that applicants, and their counsel, encounter when requesting a suspension of a Determination.  The applicant in this case had been ordered to pay a former employee $4,158.74, representing wages, annual vacation pay and interest.  Prior to submitting a suspension request, the applicant’s counsel had requested an explanation of the process governing the suspension of a determination.  An officer of the Tribunal responded to the applicant’s request and clarified the process.  The officer clearly laid out what was required if the applicant intended to proceed with the suspension request.  The applicant’s counsel was told the applicant was required to provide written submissions as to why the suspension should be granted.  As well, counsel for the applicant was informed that the applicant would be required to explain if any deposit would be offered to the Director in respect of the determination and if not, the reason why.  Despite receiving these instructions, the applicant failed to make any written submissions whatsoever.  The Tribunal Member found, in the circumstances, the applicant had abandoned the suspension request.  In any event, the Tribunal Member would have denied the applicant’s request for suspension as the applicant failed to discharge its burden that a suspension order was warranted in the circumstances.

In 0708964 B.C. Ltd. [16], the Tribunal considered a request to suspend a determination by an applicant that owned property on which a school was situated.  The applicant requested a suspension on the basis that the Director made an error in law and further that it would be required to sell the property in order the raise the necessary funds to post security.  While the Tribunal was not prepared to characterize the appeal as destined to fail, it did not accept the applicant’s argument that selling the land was the only practical option open to the applicant.  In addition, the Tribunal noted that the applicant was the only likely source of recovery of the complainants’ unpaid wages.  On this basis, the application to suspend the effect of the determination was refused.

Another Tribunal decision where suspension was refused occurred in Wren.[17]  The applicant applied for an order pursuant to section 113 of the Act suspending the effect of the determination pending the result of the appeal.  The applicant asserted a strong case on the merits and, accordingly, submitted that the determination should be suspended without him having to pay any funds, or alternatively, only a nominal sum.  The Tribunal briefly reviewed the merits of the appeal, as well as the financial circumstances of the applicant.  The Tribunal noted that the applicant had failed to provide any corroborating information about his financial circumstances.  The Tribunal also emphasized the fact that the applicant did not appear to have any close personal connections to the province of British Columbia apart from keeping a business office, that he “rarely visits”, in New Westminster.  The Tribunal thus concluded that a suspension order was not appropriate.

In the decision of Judy Harvey and Melvin Martin operating as The Sportsman Country Inn[18], the Tribunal refused the applicant’s suspension request.  At the time the Tribunal heard the suspension request, the Director had already taken steps to collect on the amount ordered to be paid under the determination.  In particular, the Director had issued a garnishment order on the applicant employer’s bank account.  The appeal hearing had been originally scheduled at an earlier date but was subsequently adjourned at the request of the employer.  At that time, no collection action had been commenced by the Director.  However, the Director stated that subsequently it had learned that the applicant was diverting funds into another company and that the applicant was actively trying to sell the operation.  In these circumstances, the Director felt justified in taking action on collecting on the determination.  The Tribunal noted that the employer did not respond to the submissions of the Director, nor did it offer any particulars to support the application apart from its claim that the garnishment created a financial hardship.   The Tribunal held that the applicant had not met its burden that the determination should be suspended.

In Pacific Western Costal Constructors Ltd.[19], the Tribunal considered a suspension request by the applicant employer who appealed a determination of the Director ordering it to pay $51,056.60, representing wages and accrued interest to 30 former employees.  The applicant was a subcontractor that had commenced proceedings in the British Columbia Supreme Court against the developer as the applicant alleged it was due unpaid amounts.  The applicant did not dispute that the employees were entitled to wages.  However, the applicant took the position that the disputed funds in respect of the Supreme Court action included the outstanding wages and that it was not in a position to deposit any funds with the Director.  The applicant had filed a lien against the property and the funds in dispute had been paid into the Supreme Court by the developer pending a trial.  The applicant submitted that the Director should attach the funds in Court to recover the outstanding wages instead of pursuing the applicant company.  The Director had already commenced collection procedures against the applicant, and submitted that an order to suspend the collection would unduly prejudice the collection of the unpaid wages.  The employees argued that the dispute between the applicant and the developer should not preclude them from seeking payment of their wages.

In denying the application to suspend the determination, the Tribunal was convinced that the appeal had no merit.  The Tribunal found that a dispute with a third party could not result in depriving the employees of their wages.  Further, the Tribunal emphasized the risk that the employees would never completely recover their wages given the fact that the employer had stated it had no funds to deposit pending the appeal of the determination.

In Lowan[20], the applicants appealed a determination issued by the Director ordering the applicants to pay their former employee the sum of $15,664.01 on account of unpaid wages and interest.  The applicants’ counsel requested that the determination be suspended without any deposit with the Director.  In response, the Director submitted that the determination should be suspended only if the applicants deposit the full amount required to be paid under the determination.  The applicants’ submission that a suspension order was warranted in the circumstances rested primarily on the fact that the applicants’ business was no longer operating and both applicants had limited liquid financial assets.  The Tribunal came to the conclusion that a suspension was not appropriate given the legitimate concern of whether the applicants would be able to pay the determination should it be confirmed on appeal.

C.        Reconsideration of Appeals

In The City of Surrey[21], the Tribunal Panel considered a suspension request from a determination, whereby the applicant municipality applied for a reconsideration of a decision issued by the Tribunal.  In this case, the City of Surrey (the “City”) had applied for a reconsideration of a determination that was confirmed on appeal requiring it to pay approximately $205,000 to the Director, to cover wages and other statutory entitlements to 32 persons receiving firefighting instruction.  In connection with its reconsideration application, the City applied under section 113 of the Act to have the Tribunal suspend the effect of the determination pending the outcome of the reconsideration proceedings.  The Director and the Surrey Firefighter’s Association both objected to the City’s section 113 application.

The City submitted in support of its suspension request that it did not wish to be in the position of having to recoup significant amounts of money from a number of individuals in the event that the reconsideration application was successful.  Moreover, the City confirmed that there was no issue in respect of its ability to pay.  In response, the Director submitted that a suspension request was not available pending a reconsideration application and, further, the Director maintained that the City had not followed through with an earlier promise to have funds paid to the Director.  The City responded that it was prepared to deposit the full amount with the Director in trust pending the outcome of the reconsideration provided the Director would not disburse the funds until after a decision was made.  The Tribunal first addressed the threshold question of whether it had the legal authority to suspend the effect of a determination pending a reconsideration decision.  The Tribunal held that the language, context and legislative intent of section 113 was that the power exercised by the Tribunal ought to be only exercised in the context of appellate proceedings over which it has exclusive jurisdiction.  The Tribunal then cited two earlier Tribunal decisions for the following proposition:

The language should not be read so as to permit the Tribunal to encroach on the role of      the courts or other adjudicative bodies merely because a person has appealed sometime in          the past: see Re New Pacific Limousine Service Inc.[22] and Re Paradon Computer Systems.[23]

The Tribunal rejected the Director’s narrow interpretation of the legislation whereby section 113 would only apply in the period between the determination and the original Tribunal appeal decision.  Instead, the Tribunal took a middle ground approach and interpreted the provision to read that a “person who appeals” a determination may make a section 113 request at any point while the statutory appeal process, including the reconsideration process, is ongoing.  The Tribunal felt the broad authority given to the Tribunal to suspend a determination under section 113 to ensure justice is done during an appeal supported this view.  According to the Tribunal, to exclude section 113 from the reconsideration process would prevent the Tribunal from ensuring that justice is done with respect to reconsiderations.

The Tribunal found the Director’s submissions to be more convincing with respect to discretion than that of jurisdiction.  The Tribunal identified two factors that become particularly important when a suspension request is made in the context of a reconsideration application.  First, the suspension request will generally occur prior to the Panel even making a decision on the preliminary issue of whether to even engage in the reconsideration process.  Second, the application will arise from a considered appeal decision by an Adjudicator.  In consideration of those factors, the Tribunal took the position that for the Tribunal to allow a suspension request in the context of a reconsideration application, an applicant must make a “clear and compelling” case to the Tribunal that it will suffer prejudice if a suspension order is denied.  As such, the party requesting a suspension should demonstrate to the Tribunal that it has contacted the Director in good faith, was not able to reach an agreement with respect to payment and disbursement pending the reconsideration, and that the Director’s stance pending the outcome of the reconsideration will cause them serious hardship.

Applying those principles to the case at bar, the Tribunal found that a mutually agreeable situation was available whereby the City would forward the funds to the Director on the condition they would not be paid until after the reconsideration decision was made.  It was not clear on the evidence, however, whether the City had actually forwarded the funds to the Director.  On this basis, the Tribunal encouraged the parties to resolve the disbursement issue.  In any event, the Tribunal was not prepared to suspend the determination pending the reconsideration process.  The Tribunal noted that it did not have sufficient evidence regarding the prejudice that the City would suffer if the money were paid out to the employees, nor did it have clear evidence that the Director was insisting on ordering the funds disbursed prior to the reconsideration decision.

In The City of New Westminster[24], the Tribunal considered a suspension request, in conjunction with an application for reconsideration brought by the City of New Westminster (the “City”).  The City applied for reconsideration of an Adjudicator’s decision confirming a determination finding that the City had breached the Act when it charged job applicants a $50 non-refundable fee as part of the application process.  In support of its suspension application, the City submitted that it had a meritorious appeal, that its conduct throughout the investigation process had been excellent, and that it was financially solvent.  Further, the City submitted that it would suffer prejudice because of the difficulty the City would face in recovering the amount ordered in the determination from the individuals in the event the Tribunal cancels or varies the determination.  In response, the Director raised a preliminary objection that a suspension pending a reconsideration decision was not contemplated by section 113 of the Act.  The Director also submitted that the matter was at a point at which the full amount of the determination should be deposited with the Director.  Finally, the Director submitted that at the reconsideration stage, the employer should interact directly with the Director, as a statutory fiduciary, responsible for enforcement under the Act, with respect to disbursement of funds collected.

The Tribunal dispensed with the preliminary objection that a suspension order was not available on a reconsideration application by following the identical analysis that the Tribunal undertook in The City of Surrey.[25] The Tribunal then considered the facts in the present case.  In dismissing the suspension application, the Tribunal found that the City had failed to raise any compelling reason as to why it had failed to offer to deposit the full amount with the Director.  Moreover, the Tribunal found that the City had failed to provide any basis for its submission that the Director had taken a position to the City’s prejudice with respect to the issue of disbursement during the reconsideration process.

D.        Suspension Orders Rendered Moot

In circumstances where the Tribunal releases a decision regarding a suspension request at the same time as issuing its decision on the merits of the appeal, the suspension order will be rendered moot.  This situation was illustrated by the Tribunal decision in More Group.[26] In that case, three related companies, More Marine Ltd., More Management Ltd., and Morecorp Holdings Ltd. (collectively,  the “More Group”), appealed a determination of the Director in the amount of $4,710.37.  The Tribunal’s decision specifically related to the unpaid wages of one of its former employees.  The More Group sought a suspension of the determination pending the appeal and advised the Tribunal that it was prepared to place the amounts ordered in the determination in the trust accounts of its legal counsel.  The Tribunal was convinced that the appeal had merit with respect to More Marine Ltd. and More Management Ltd.; however, because the Tribunal ordered that the determination be cancelled as against these two companies in the same decision, the suspension issue was rendered moot.  With respect to Morecorp Holdings Ltd., the Tribunal denied the application to suspend the determination as it was not persuaded that its appeal had any merit.


Upon reviewing a number of decisions on the suspension of a determination, it became apparent to the Author that applicants are often times confused by the process and do not adequately prepare for this application.  One plausible explanation is that applicants are primarily focus on the substantive aspects of the appeal to the detriment of the suspension application.  This may be exacerbated by the requirement set out in the Rules, whereby an applicant must file written submissions in respect of the application for suspension at the same time as filing the appeal or request for reconsideration.  No matter the reason, applicants are cautioned against taking a casual approach to these applications given that it is the applicant who bears the onus of satisfying the Tribunal that a suspension is warranted.

In many cases, applicants have relied on the strength of their appeal on its merits in support of their submission to post little or no money with the Director.  In the Author’s view, this reliance is misplaced.  In considering what terms and conditions should be placed on the suspension order, Tribunal Members place more weight on whether depositing money with the Director will have a prejudicial effect on the applicant.  Although the strength of an appeal on its merits is helpful in seeking a lesser amount to be deposited, especially if the lesser amount is supported by an applicant’s own calculations, the overriding factor that a Tribunal will consider in determining whether a lesser amount is justified is whether the applicant will be prejudiced.

Based on the decision in Tricom Services Inc.[27], applicants should be cautioned against claiming that they are able to pay the full amount under the determination, while also making a general assertion that they will be unduly financially prejudiced.  The Tribunal in that case highlighted this inconsistency and noted that without some “unique prejudice flowing from having to post the full amount of the Determination” it was of the view that a determination should only be suspended if the full amount of the determination is deposited with Director.

A number of common mistakes made by applicants have emerged in a number of Tribunal decisions.  Five common errors are set out below:

  • Failing to deposit the full amount that is required to be paid under the determination with the Director, or some lesser amount with the Director which the Tribunal would think adequate in the circumstances; [28]
  • Neglecting to provide written reasons for why a suspension of the determination should be ordered;[29]
  • Failing to provide corroborating  documents in support of a contention of undue financial hardship;[30]
  • A bare and unspecified claim that the Director failed to observe the principles of natural justice in reaching its determination; [31] and
  • Failing to set out the nature of the prejudice in requesting a suspension on the ground of prejudice.[32]

The following seven instructive principles for both applicants and adjudicators are set out as follows:

  • Adjudicators should review section 113 applications through a two-stage analysis[33]:

(1)        The Tribunal should determine whether it should suspend the determination.

(2)        If a suspension is warranted, the Tribunal should then consider what terms and conditions are suitable.

  • It is the applicant’s burden to show why a determination order should be suspended;[34]
  • If there is a risk that employees will not be able to fully recover what is owed to them, the Tribunal is unlikely to grant a suspension request made by an employer;[35]
  • A suspension of a non-monetary determination is permitted;[36]
  • A suspension will not be granted where it appears the company is trying to actively avoid collection actions;[37]
  • A Tribunal will view the adequacy of a proposed deposit not just from the perspective of the applicant employer, but also from the perspective of any employees whose rights may be affected by the granting of a suspension order;[38] and
  • For a Tribunal to award a suspension in conjunction with a reconsideration application, an applicant must demonstrate a “clear and compelling” case that it will suffer serious prejudice if a suspension order is not granted.[39]


The issuance or denial of a suspension may have serious financial consequences for both the applicant and respondent in a dispute.  The granting of a suspension is a discretionary remedy and applicants should not assume their request will be approved as a matter of course.  With careful planning, however, chances for a successful outcome are significantly increased.  Prior to initiating a request, an applicant must ensure compliance with the legislative framework and provide a detailed evidentiary record for all submissions.

[1] Tricom Services Inc., BC EST #D420/97

[2] Motion Works, BC EST #D345/946

[3] TNL Paving Ltd. et al., BC EST # D002/97

[4] Tricom Services Inc., supra

[5] Miller, BC EST # D090/10

[6] Miller, supra

[7] Kootenai Community Centre Society, BC EST # D001/12

[8] Wen-Di, BC EST # D307/99

[9] Chatzispiros, EST #D520/98

[10] Holt, BC EST #D123/06

[11] RTS, BC EST #D070/03

[12] Tricom Services Inc., supra

[13] Strauss, BC EST # D095/10

[14] Miller, supra

[15] Golden Crown, BC EST # D010/09

[16] 0708964 B.C. Ltd., BC EST # D126/10

[17] Wren, BC EST #D099/10

[18] Judy Harvey and Melvin Martin operating as The Sportsman Country Inn, BC EST #D411/00

[19] Pacific Western Coastal Constructors Ltd., BC EST D#074/08

[20] Lowan, BC EST D#254/00

[21] The City of Surrey, BC EST #D049/99

[22] Re New Pacific Limousine Service Inc., BC EST D#054/96

[23] Re Paradon Computer Systems, BC EST D#221/98

[24] The City of New Westminster, BC EST D#518/98

[25] The City of Surrey, supra

[26] More Group, BC EST #D078/08

[27] Tricom Services Inc., supra

[28] RTS, supra

[29] Strauss, supra

[30] 0708964 B.C. Ltd., supra

[31] Strauss, supra

[32] TNL Paving Ltd. et al,, supra

[33] Miller, supra

[34] Strauss, supra

[35] Pacific Western Coastal Constructors Ltd., supra

[36] TNL Paving Ltd. et al., supra

[37] Judy Harvey and Melvin Martin operating as The Sportsman Country Inn, supra

[38] Tricom Services Inc., supra

[39] The City of Surrey, supra

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Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) and Devin Lucas (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment | ....
Shafik Bhalloo
Tuesday, September 17th, 2013    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.

Employment Contracts and Fresh Consideration

By Shafik Bhalloo, Sasha Ramnarine, Devin Lucas


An essential element in the formation and enforceability of any contract is consideration. Each party receives a benefit from the contract and may suffer corresponding detriment. This benefit and detriment are referred to as consideration. Without it, a contract is not binding or enforceable.

Employment contracts are no exception to this rule. Without consideration, any employment contract that is formed between an employer and employee is not enforceable.  In today’s economy, many employers are involved in reorganizing or downsizing. This often leads to the employer unilaterally changing the terms of employment of an existing contract by adding significant duties or reducing compensation or other benefits. An employer may ask an employee to sign a new contract with introduce more restrictive terms which have not previously been discussed with the employee. The employee often agrees to these changes without much question. The issue that arises in such situations is whether unilateral changes to a contract of employment made by the employer after the employee has started employment are enforceable if there is no new consideration provided to the employee.

Courts in Canada have held that fresh consideration must be given by the employer to the employee in exchange for modified terms to an existing employment contract.  The following cases demonstrate this principle.

In Singh v. Empire Life Insurance Co.[1], the primary issue before the British Columbia Court of Appeal was whether or not the terms of an Employment Agreement were enforceable.  Harry Singh commenced work on September 1, 1998 as the Regional Manager for the Vancouver Bayshore.  At Mr. Singh’s request, a representative of the employer provided a letter of comfort dated September 1 to Mr. Singh.  The letter stated:

This is a Letter of Comfort stating that Harry Singh is offered the position of Regional Manager of Empire Financial Group with a total compensation package of $170,000 made up a number of components.  Effective September 1, 1998.  A formal letter and contract will follow.

Subsequently, Mr. Singh received another letter dated the same day under the heading “Re Confirmation of Offer – Regional Manager, Vancouver Bayshore”.  This letter confirmed specific details of Mr. Singh’s employment with respect to his salary and the fact that the initial term would be for 2 years.  Mr. Singh continued in that employment for five months before the Employment Agreement was executed.  This agreement contained a termination clause stating that “the termination will be effective at the end of the appropriate period of notice according to applicable provincial legislation”.  In November 2012, Mr. Singh’s position became redundant and he was let go.  Mr. Singh then commenced an action against the employer claiming damages for the remaining ten months in the two year term.  The employer argued that the contract was terminable on two weeks’ notice pursuant to the Employment Standards Act.


The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s finding that the employer could not rely on the provisions of the subsequently signed agreement, which were less favourable to Mr. Singh than the terms of the original contract.  In so holding, the Court affirmed the leading British Columbia Court of Appeal decision of Watson v. Moore Corporation Ltd.[2]


In Watson, McEachern C.J.B.C., writing for the majority, found that unless the employer had a clear intention of terminating the employee’s employment prior to the employee executing the contract amendment, the mere forbearance from termination at this juncture was not adequate consideration for the amendment.

The Court of Appeal in Singh ultimately found that when the Employment Agreement was signed there was no benefit passing to Mr. Singh that he would not otherwise be entitled to.  As such, the contract was held to be unenforceable.

In the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Hobbs v TDI Canada Ltd.[3], the Plaintiff, Hobbs, was an experienced advertising salesperson who took a job with TDI Canada Ltd. (“TDI”). Prior to his start date, there was an oral agreement between Hobbs and TDI on the commission rates Hobbs was to receive. Shortly after Hobbs commenced his employment, he was given a non-negotiable Solicitor’s Agreement.  The Solicitor’s Agreement provided for a more restrictive commission rate than what was previously agreed to.  Further, the Solicitor’s Agreement allowed TDI to revise the commission rate at its sole discretion. Hobbs subsequently signed the document as he would otherwise not receive payment. As time passed, Hobbs was not paid the commissions that he believed were owed to him; therefore, he resigned from the company and sued TDI for the outstanding commissions.

The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the enforceability of the Solicitor’s Agreement. The Court of Appeal determined that the agreement did not form part of Hobbs’ employment contract for lack of consideration. As a result, the Court of Appeal ordered TDI to pay Hobbs the commissions he was owed based on the earlier oral agreement.  In reaching this decision, the appellate court reviewed a number of leading authorities on the requirement of consideration in employment contracts and stated:

[32] … [Francis v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce] makes it clear the law does not permit employers to present employees with changed terms of employment, threaten to fire them if they do not agree to them, and rely on the continued employment relationships as the consideration for the new terms.

[35] In Techform Products Ltd., Rosenberg J.A. similarly recognized that new consideration is required in order to modify an existing employment contract. He stated at para. 24:

It is also consistent with the principle fundamental to consideration in the context of an employment contract amendment — that in return for the new promise received by the employer something must pass to the employee, beyond that to which the employee is entitled under the original contract. Continued employment represents nothing more of value flowing to the employee than under the original contract.

The Court of Appeal further addressed the power imbalance in employment relationships and the vulnerability of employees in relation to their employers at para. 42:

The requirement of consideration to support an amended agreement is especially            important in the employment context where, generally, there is inequality of         bargaining power between employees and employers. Some employees may enjoy             a measure of bargaining power when negotiating the terms of prospective       employment, but once they        have been hired and are dependent on the remuneration of the new job, they become     more vulnerable.

What do these cases mean for employers?

The above noted decisions clearly stand for the proposition that an amendment to a pre-existing employment contract will not be enforced unless there is an added benefit to both parties. A basic rule of thumb for employers to follow is to have an employee sign a contract that is suitable to the employer before the employee commences his or her employment.  Alternatively, it is critical when introducing new terms to a pre-existing employment contract that employers provide fresh consideration to the employee.  The lack of fresh consideration increases the risk that the modified terms of an employment contract will not be upheld by a court of law.

What would be considered adequate consideration?

There are no cases that outline a specific test to determine what constitutes adequate consideration when an employer modifies the terms of employment.  In Krieser v. Active Chemicals Ltd.[4], Neilson J. provides some guidance as to what would form adequate consideration in the employment context. At para. 35, Neilson J. stated:

I have found, however, that the defendant must show something more than continuation of the plaintiff’s employment on more onerous terms for an uncertain time to establish adequate consideration. Some additional advantage must flow to the plaintiff for agreeing to the new terms. I find that the defendant has failed to establish that here. There is nothing in the terms of the Contract that confers a benefit on the plaintiff. Nor do I see any basis for concluding that signing it provided him with any increased security of employment, either expressly or implicitly. The plaintiff remained a probationary employee under both the Contract and the Act, and could be dismissed with no notice during the first six months of his employment. While the Contract thereafter provided more generous notice provisions than the Act, these were less generous than his common law rights once several years of employment had been completed.

Neilson J. indicated that the consideration must be some ‘additional advantage’ moving to the employee.  Yet, it is unclear what this additional advantage must be.  In the writer’s view, the nature of this advantage would invariably depend on the type of position that is held by an employee.  Some advantages may include an increase of vacation pay, notice requirements, life insurance, severance pay, or health and dental benefits. The sufficiency of consideration is still an open question at this point; however, it is a significant issue that will likely have far reaching implications for employers and workers throughout Canada.

[1] 2002 BCCA 452.

[2] (1996), 21 B.C.L.R. (3d) 157.

[3] (2004), 246 D.L.R. (4th) 43.

[4] 2005 BCSC 1370.


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Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment, Other | ....
Shafik Bhalloo
Tuesday, August 6th, 2013    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.

Limiting Common Law Notice in Employment Contracts

By Shafik Bhalloo and Devin Lucas

It is settled law in Canada that an employer may displace an employee’s right under the common law to reasonable notice of termination by contracting to a lesser notice or severance entitlement. However, the notice or severance period must meet the statutory notice requirements outlined in the applicable provincial employment standards legislation; otherwise it will be of no effect. In British Columbia for instance, Section 4 of the Employment Standards Act provides that the requirements of the Act are minimum requirements and any agreement to waive those requirements has no effect In Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd.[1], where the employer had contracted to give its employees notice or severance below the minimum provided in the Ontario Employment Standards Act, the Supreme Court of Canada declared the provision null and void for all purposes and held that the provision could not be used to interpret the parties’ intentions with respect to notice entitlement upon termination. The Court then went on to conclude that the employees were entitled to reasonable notice because the presumption of reasonable notice was not rebutted. In so concluding, the Court reasoned that such a conclusion was consistent with the legislative intent of the Act which expressly preserved the civil remedies otherwise available to an employee against his or her employer and provided employers an incentive to comply with the minimum statutory provisions of the Act. Not only must the notice provision comply with the minimum applicable employment standards legislation, it must be drafted carefully if the employer is to successfully limit the common law notice. In British Columbia, in McLennan v. Apollo Forest Products Ltd.[2], the province’s Supreme Court considered a wrongful dismissal action brought by Marvin McLennan, a former “bin chaser” at a sawmill.  Part of Mr. McLennan’s employment contract was contained in an employee handbook.  The handbook contained the following termination provision:

The terms and conditions of employment at Apollo Forest Products Ltd. are in accordance with the Employment Standards Act and other legislation of the Province of British Columbia governing the Employer/Employee relationship in the workplace.

Upon being dismissed, Mr. McLennan brought a wrongful dismissal action against his employer arguing that he was entitled to common law severance pay.  In response, the employer argued that the two weeks’ pay that was provided as severance pay pursuant to the Employment Standards Act[3] was adequate.  The B.C. Supreme Court held that the express provisions of the contract did not restrict the notice to the minimum set out in the Employment Standards Act; therefore, making it necessary and appropriate for the Court to determine the reasonable notice period to which the employee was entitled at common law.

McLennan provides support for the proposition that an employment contract, which incorporates provisions of employment standards legislation by reference, will not be sufficient to provide the clarity of intention required to rebut the presumption that reasonable notice in accordance with the common law applies.  In order to do so, the contract would have to go further and clearly limit the reasonable notice period to the applicable statutory legislation.

Recommendations for Employers

It is recommended that employers, when attempting to limit common law notice or severance, do not violate the minimum provincial employment standards legislation. Where the employer is trying to limit the notice to the minimum in the employment standards legislation, it is recommended that the employer draft the limiting clause in very clear and unambiguous terms limiting to such statutory notice or payment in lieu of notice.

[1] [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986

[2] 1993 CarswellBC 1250.

[3] R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 113.

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Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment | ....
Shafik Bhalloo
Monday, January 7th, 2013    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.

By Shafik Bhalloo

In a recent criminal decision, R. v. Cole[1], the Supreme Court of Canada provided much needed guidance on when an employee may reasonably expect  data stored on his work issued computer will be treated as private. In this case, a high school teacher, who also worked with the school’s IT department in supervising computer use by students and staff, had authority to remotely access the data stored on student computers connected to the school network and accessed a student’s email account. The teacher found nude photographs of another student and copied them onto the hard drive of his school-issued laptop. Under the school’s Acceptable Use Agreement (“UA”), the teacher was allowed to use his work-issued laptop for both work and personal purposes. When a technician employed by the school, while performing regular maintenance work on the teacher’s laptop, discovered a hidden folder on the teacher’s laptop containing the said photographs, he notified the school’s principal. Pursuant to the latter’s instructions, the technician copied the pictures to a compact disc. The principal, subsequently, seized the laptop and, thereafter, the technician copied, on a second compact disc, temporary internet files from the laptop. The laptop was then turned over to the police, together with the two discs. The police, without obtaining a search warrant in advance, examined the contents of the laptop and the two discs and created a mirror image of the laptop’s hard drive. The teacher was later charged with possession of child pornography.

At trial, the teacher applied and was successful under section 8 and subsection 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have the evidence against him excluded on the basis that it was obtained in a manner violating his constitutional rights under the Charter. On appeal by the Crown, the Ontario High Court of Justice reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the trial judge erred in law in concluding that Mr. Cole had an objectively reasonable subjective expectation of privacy stating that the judge erroneously ignored the following contextual factors:

  • The teacher’s acceptance of the employer’s UA as terms of his employment, which afforded him knowledge that the data and information on the computer and drives assigned to him by the employer were not private;
  • The teacher also worked with the school’s IT department staff to supervise and monitor both the computer use by students and staff of the high school and the overall integrity of the school’s network, and, in this supervisory capacity, the teacher had domain-wide privileges which demonstrated to him that the data on his computer drives was accessible by employer representatives such as himself;
  • In light of the first two points above, indicators such as the teacher’s password and his exclusive possession of the laptop as part of his employment were not privacy indicators;
  • The teacher’s knowledge that the hardware and software in and connected to the laptop belonged to the employer.

On appeal by the teacher, the Court of Appeal of Ontario set aside the latter decision in part holding that the disc containing the temporary internet files, the laptop and the mirror image of its hard drive should be excluded. The Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:

[76] … the fact that the discs and laptop in this case had been lawfully seized by the principal and the school board and delivered to the police does not affect the continuing privacy expectations of the appellant. Police are not relieved from the stringent standard of obtaining judicial authorization to conduct a search or seizure based on reasonable and probable grounds, simply because they are provided with evidence in circumstances where the accused’s Charter rights were either not engaged or were not infringed in the initial gathering of that evidence….

[77] …The appellant’s privacy interest with respect to his laptop continued throughout its transfer to police, notwithstanding that it was the property of the school board, and already lawfully seized by them. Personal information was also stored on the laptop.

The police conducted a search and seizure of the laptop and seized the mirror image of the hard drive, capturing every piece of personal information the appellant may have stored on it, including the photographs of his wife, without a warrant.

[78] The appellant also had a privacy interest in his personal internet browsing history and what it revealed about his personal predilections and choices. In R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 3, the Supreme Court referred to this as ‘the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on the Internet’. Because the appellant had a continuing privacy interest in this information, the transfer of the disc with the temporary internet files to the police was a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter.

[79] The police search of the laptop and the disc with the temporary internet files is therefore prima facie unreasonable. The onus shifts to the Crown to establish that this warrantless search by police was nonetheless reasonable. There were no exigent circumstances. Both the school environment and the evidence were secure; the teacher was suspended and the police were in possession of the discs and the laptop. The school board had no authority to consent to the search. This warrantless search was not reasonable. Therefore, the police violated the appellant’s s. 8 rights when they searched the laptop and the disc with the temporary internet files.

However, the Court of Appeal viewed the disc containing images of the student differently, stating:

Given that the photographs were taken from the school’s network, using the school’s computer and were the subject of the privacy interest of a student, the appellant had no personal privacy interest in the data. The photographs were found by the technician in plain view, while engaged in permissible access. They were lawfully seized by the principal and transferred to police. As the functional equivalent of photographs in an envelope, the police did not need to conduct a further search of this evidence. Because the appellant had no privacy interest in the photographs themselves (as opposed to the presence of those photographs in the laptop), the delivery of the disc to police was not a seizure.

On Appeal by the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada, while agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the teacher had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and the police infringed the teacher’s privacy protected under section 8 of the Charter, allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal. In arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Justice Fish, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, delineated the following instructive principles:

  • Whether at home or in the workplace, computers are reasonably used for personal purpose and contain information that is meaningful, intimate and touching on the user’s biographical core;
  • The user may reasonably expect privacy in the information contained on their computer particularly where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected;
  • While ownership of the computer and workplace policies are relevant considerations, neither is determinative of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy;
  • The totality of all the circumstances will need to be considered to determine whether privacy is a reasonable expectation in any particular case;
  • Workplace policies and practices may diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy in a work computer; however they may not in themselves remove the expectation entirely;
  • A reasonable, though diminished expectation of privacy, is nonetheless a reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by s. 8 of the Charter and subject only to state intrusion under the authority of a reasonable law.

Applying the above principles to the facts in this case, Fish J. stated the operational realities of the teacher’s workplace consisted of factors that pulled in competing directions. In particular, Fish J. noted that while the written policy, and actual practice at work, permitted the teacher to use his work-issued laptop for personal purpose, the policy and technological reality deprived him of exclusive control and access to the personal information he recorded on the laptop. More particularly, Fish J. noted that the written policy of the school, of which the teacher was reminded by the principal annually, provided that the data and messages generated on or handled by the employer’s equipment was owned by the employer and he was aware that the contents of his hard drive were available to all other users and technicians with domain administration right. On the totality of the circumstances, Fish J. concluded that the teacher had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in his internet browsing history and the informational content of his work-issued laptop; it contained information that was meaningful, intimate and touching on his biographical core.

Having said this, however, the Supreme Court did not find the school to have acted unreasonably or in breach of s. 8 of the Charter when its technician inspected the teacher’s laptop in context of routine inspection or when the school subsequently seized the laptop at the instruction of the principal because the school’s principal had a statutory duty to maintain a safe school environment. However, the school’s lawful authority did not afford the police lawful authority to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of the computer material and examine its contents, according to the Supreme Court. In particular, Fish J. reasoned:

[67] In taking possession of the computer material and examining its contents, the police acted independently of the school board (R. v. Colarusso, 1994 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, at pp. 58-60). The fact that the school board had acquired lawful possession of the laptop for its own administrative purposes did not vest in the police a delegated or derivative power to appropriate and search the computer for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

[73] The school board was, of course, legally entitled to inform the police of its discovery of contraband on the laptop. This would doubtless have permitted the police to obtain a warrant to search the computer for the contraband. But receipt of the computer from the school board did not afford the police warrantless access to the personal information contained within it. This information remained subject, at all relevant times, to Mr. Cole’s reasonable and subsisting expectation of privacy.

Having found that the police breached the teacher’s privacy rights under section 8 of the Charter, Fish J. embarked on an inquiry under s. 24(2) of the Charter, namely, whether the unconstitutionally-obtained evidence by the police should be excluded. Here, Fish J. considered a three-part balancing test set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Grant[2]. In particular, Fish J. considered (i) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct of the police; (ii) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interest of the teacher; and (iii) the society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. In setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and allowing the unconstitutionally-obtained evidence, Fish J. stated with respect to the first part of the Grant test:

[84] Regarding the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the courts below focused on the actions of Detective Constable Timothy Burtt, the officer who took possession of the computer material, who searched the discs, and who sent the laptop away for forensic examination. The trial judge concluded that this officer’s actions were ‘egregious’ (para. 26), and the Court of Appeal considered his conduct serious enough to favour exclusion.

[85] I am unable to share either conclusion.

[86] The police officer did not knowingly or deliberately disregard the warrant requirement. As events were unfolding in this case, the law governing privacy expectations in work computers was still unsettled. Without the guidance of appellate case law, D.C. Burtt believed, erroneously but understandably, that he had the power to search without a warrant.

[87] He did not act negligently or in bad faith. Nor does his conduct evidence insensitivity to Charter values, or an unacceptable ignorance of Mr. Cole’s rights under the Charter. The officer did not rely exclusively, as the courts below suggested, on his mistaken belief that the ownership of the laptop was necessarily determinative. While this was an important factor underlying his decision not to obtain a search warrant, the officer also turned his mind to whether Mr. Cole had an expectation of privacy in the laptop (p. 130). He was alert to the possibility that the hard drive contained private or privileged material (pp. 130-31 and 164). And he testified that he intended to respect Mr. Cole’s privacy interest in this regard (p. 131).

[89] …Where a police officer could have acted constitutionally but did not, this might indicate that the officer adopted a casual attitude toward — or, still worse, deliberately flouted — the individual’s Charter rights (Buhay, at paras. 63-64). But that is not this case: The officer, as mentioned earlier, appears to have sincerely, though erroneously, considered Mr. Cole’s Charter interests.

[90] Accordingly, in my view, the trial judge’s finding of ‘egregious’ conduct was tainted by clear and determinative error (Côté, at para. 51). On the undisputed evidence, the conduct of the officer was simply not an egregious breach of the Charter. As earlier seen, the officer did attach great importance to the school board’s ownership of the laptop, but not to the exclusion of other considerations. He did not ‘confuse ownership of hardware with privacy in the contents of software’ (trial reasons, para. 29).

With respect to the second part of the Grant test, Fish J. stated:

[91] Turning then to the impact of the breach on Mr. Cole’s Charter-protected interests, the question relates to ‘the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed’ (Grant, at para. 76). In the context of a s. 8 breach, as here, the focus is on the magnitude or intensity of the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and on whether the search demeaned his or her dignity (R. v. Belnavis, 1997 CanLII 320 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, at para. 40; Grant, at para. 78).

[92] In his s. 24(2)analysis, the trial judge neglected entirely to consider the diminished nature of Mr. Cole’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Likewise, the Court of Appeal overlooked the fact that the operational realities of Mr. Cole’s workplace attenuated the effect of the breach on his Charter-protected interests.

[93] Moreover, the courts below failed to consider the impact of the ‘discoverability’ of the computer evidence on the second Grant inquiry. As earlier noted, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a warrant. Had he complied with the applicable constitutional requirements, the evidence would necessarily have been discovered. This further attenuated the impact of the breach on Mr. Cole’s Charter-protected interests (Côté, at para. 72).

Finally, with respect to the third part of the Grant test, Fish J. stated:

Finally, I turn to the third Grant inquiry: society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits. The question is ‘whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion’ (Grant, at para. 79).

[95] Not unlike the the considerations under the first and second inquiries, the considerations under this third inquiry must not be permitted to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis (Côté, at para. 48; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 (CanLII), 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 40). They are nonetheless entitled to appropriate weight and, in the circumstances of this case, they clearly weigh against exclusion of the evidence.

[96] The laptop, the mirror image of its hard drive, and the disc containing Mr. Cole’s temporary Internet files are all highly reliable and probative physical evidence. And while excluding it would not “gut” the prosecution entirely, I accept the Crown’s submission that the forensic examination of the laptop, at least, is “critical”: the metadata on the laptop may allow the Crown to establish, for example, when the photographs were downloaded and whether they have ever been accessed.

[97] In sum, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The breach was not high on the scale of seriousness, and its impact was attenuated by both the diminished privacy interest and the discoverability of the evidence. The exclusion of the material would, however, have a marked negative impact on the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process.

For the above reasons, Fish J. did not exclude the evidence unlawfully obtained by the police.

While the case is a criminal one and engages an individual’s privacy rights under s. 8 of the Charter since it involves state (police) intrusion of an individual’s privacy rights, the privacy principles articulated by Fish J. will undoubtedly be considered by courts in future employment law cases and employers should be mindful of those principles in structuring their relationship with their employees.

It is recommended that employers should implement clear policies that define, in unequivocal terms, the employer’s expectations surrounding workplace computer use, including smartphone use, if employers provide such equipment to employees in an employment context. Although Fish J., in R. v. Cole, stated that workplace policies are not determinative of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, if properly drafted a workplace policy combined with consistent employer actions in the workplace, may diminish, objectively, the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, where both the employer’s workplace policy and the employer’s actions in the workplace are consistent in prohibiting any personal use by employees of employer-issued computers or smartphones and where the employee has acknowledge receipt of employer’s policy that provides that any data sent, stored or received using the employer’s computer or smartphone is the property of the employer and the employer reserves the right to perform random checks or audits of the employee’s computer or smartphone use, the employee may be hard pressed to argue that he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

[1] 2012 SCC 53

[2] 2009 SCC 32

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Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) | Filed under Labour & Employment | ....