Section 18(2) enables the court to deprive an arbitrator of his or her fees and direct the arbitrator to pay some or all of the costs if removed under Section 18(1). The intent of this section is to avoid burdening the parties with the cost of the first hearing in addition to expenses incurred for a second proceeding before a replacement arbitrator.

Pursuant to section 18(3) of the Act, a court may appoint an arbitrator to replace one removed under section 18(1) and the effect of an appointment of an arbitrator under subsection (3) is as if the appointment had been made pursuant to the initial arbitration agreement

The Supreme Court of British Columbia in considering section 18 has held that the words “corrupt” and “fraudulent” were to be given their ordinary meaning.[2] “Corrupt conduct” is conduct so immoral that the injustice of the action would be evident such as activities undertaken with an evil purpose in mind or willfully immoral or dishonest which would impact the matter on which an arbitrator has been requested to adjudicate. “Fraudulent conduct” is conduct that is deceitful, dishonest, and deceptive. To succeed in an accusation of fraudulent conduct the litigant must show that the arbitrator knew or ought to have known that he or she was following a course of action that was deceitful, dishonest, and deceptive. [1] Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55
[2] Zaleschuk Pubs Ltd. v. Barop Construction Ltd., (1992) 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 340 (B.C.S.C.) ]]> http://www.businesslawblog.ca/2013/03/removal-of-an-arbitrator-in-british-columbia/feed/ 0 http://www.businesslawblog.ca/2013/01/supreme-court-rules-that-employees-have-a-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-in-the-workplace-3/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=supreme-court-rules-that-employees-have-a-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-in-the-workplace-3 http://www.businesslawblog.ca/2013/01/supreme-court-rules-that-employees-have-a-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-in-the-workplace-3/#comments Mon, 07 Jan 2013 18:00:13 +0000 Shafik Bhalloo http://www.businesslawblog.ca/?p=893

By Shafik Bhalloo

In a recent criminal decision, R. v. Cole[1], the Supreme Court of Canada provided much needed guidance on when an employee may reasonably expect  data stored on his work issued computer will be treated as private. In this case, a high school teacher, who also worked with the school’s IT department in supervising computer use by students and staff, had authority to remotely access the data stored on student computers connected to the school network and accessed a student’s email account. The teacher found nude photographs of another student and copied them onto the hard drive of his school-issued laptop. Under the school’s Acceptable Use Agreement (“UA”), the teacher was allowed to use his work-issued laptop for both work and personal purposes. When a technician employed by the school, while performing regular maintenance work on the teacher’s laptop, discovered a hidden folder on the teacher’s laptop containing the said photographs, he notified the school’s principal. Pursuant to the latter’s instructions, the technician copied the pictures to a compact disc. The principal, subsequently, seized the laptop and, thereafter, the technician copied, on a second compact disc, temporary internet files from the laptop. The laptop was then turned over to the police, together with the two discs. The police, without obtaining a search warrant in advance, examined the contents of the laptop and the two discs and created a mirror image of the laptop’s hard drive. The teacher was later charged with possession of child pornography.

At trial, the teacher applied and was successful under section 8 and subsection 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to have the evidence against him excluded on the basis that it was obtained in a manner violating his constitutional rights under the Charter. On appeal by the Crown, the Ontario High Court of Justice reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that the trial judge erred in law in concluding that Mr. Cole had an objectively reasonable subjective expectation of privacy stating that the judge erroneously ignored the following contextual factors:

• The teacher’s acceptance of the employer’s UA as terms of his employment, which afforded him knowledge that the data and information on the computer and drives assigned to him by the employer were not private;
• The teacher also worked with the school’s IT department staff to supervise and monitor both the computer use by students and staff of the high school and the overall integrity of the school’s network, and, in this supervisory capacity, the teacher had domain-wide privileges which demonstrated to him that the data on his computer drives was accessible by employer representatives such as himself;
• In light of the first two points above, indicators such as the teacher’s password and his exclusive possession of the laptop as part of his employment were not privacy indicators;
• The teacher’s knowledge that the hardware and software in and connected to the laptop belonged to the employer.

On appeal by the teacher, the Court of Appeal of Ontario set aside the latter decision in part holding that the disc containing the temporary internet files, the laptop and the mirror image of its hard drive should be excluded. The Court of Appeal reasoned as follows:

[76] … the fact that the discs and laptop in this case had been lawfully seized by the principal and the school board and delivered to the police does not affect the continuing privacy expectations of the appellant. Police are not relieved from the stringent standard of obtaining judicial authorization to conduct a search or seizure based on reasonable and probable grounds, simply because they are provided with evidence in circumstances where the accused’s Charter rights were either not engaged or were not infringed in the initial gathering of that evidence….

[77] …The appellant’s privacy interest with respect to his laptop continued throughout its transfer to police, notwithstanding that it was the property of the school board, and already lawfully seized by them. Personal information was also stored on the laptop.

The police conducted a search and seizure of the laptop and seized the mirror image of the hard drive, capturing every piece of personal information the appellant may have stored on it, including the photographs of his wife, without a warrant.

[78] The appellant also had a privacy interest in his personal internet browsing history and what it revealed about his personal predilections and choices. In R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 (CanLII), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 3, the Supreme Court referred to this as ‘the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on the Internet’. Because the appellant had a continuing privacy interest in this information, the transfer of the disc with the temporary internet files to the police was a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter.

[79] The police search of the laptop and the disc with the temporary internet files is therefore prima facie unreasonable. The onus shifts to the Crown to establish that this warrantless search by police was nonetheless reasonable. There were no exigent circumstances. Both the school environment and the evidence were secure; the teacher was suspended and the police were in possession of the discs and the laptop. The school board had no authority to consent to the search. This warrantless search was not reasonable. Therefore, the police violated the appellant’s s. 8 rights when they searched the laptop and the disc with the temporary internet files.

However, the Court of Appeal viewed the disc containing images of the student differently, stating:

Given that the photographs were taken from the school’s network, using the school’s computer and were the subject of the privacy interest of a student, the appellant had no personal privacy interest in the data. The photographs were found by the technician in plain view, while engaged in permissible access. They were lawfully seized by the principal and transferred to police. As the functional equivalent of photographs in an envelope, the police did not need to conduct a further search of this evidence. Because the appellant had no privacy interest in the photographs themselves (as opposed to the presence of those photographs in the laptop), the delivery of the disc to police was not a seizure.

On Appeal by the Crown, the Supreme Court of Canada, while agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the teacher had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and the police infringed the teacher’s privacy protected under section 8 of the Charter, allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeal. In arriving at this conclusion, Mr. Justice Fish, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, delineated the following instructive principles:

• Whether at home or in the workplace, computers are reasonably used for personal purpose and contain information that is meaningful, intimate and touching on the user’s biographical core;
• The user may reasonably expect privacy in the information contained on their computer particularly where personal use is permitted or reasonably expected;
• While ownership of the computer and workplace policies are relevant considerations, neither is determinative of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy;
• The totality of all the circumstances will need to be considered to determine whether privacy is a reasonable expectation in any particular case;
• Workplace policies and practices may diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy in a work computer; however they may not in themselves remove the expectation entirely;
• A reasonable, though diminished expectation of privacy, is nonetheless a reasonable expectation of privacy, protected by s. 8 of the Charter and subject only to state intrusion under the authority of a reasonable law.

Applying the above principles to the facts in this case, Fish J. stated the operational realities of the teacher’s workplace consisted of factors that pulled in competing directions. In particular, Fish J. noted that while the written policy, and actual practice at work, permitted the teacher to use his work-issued laptop for personal purpose, the policy and technological reality deprived him of exclusive control and access to the personal information he recorded on the laptop. More particularly, Fish J. noted that the written policy of the school, of which the teacher was reminded by the principal annually, provided that the data and messages generated on or handled by the employer’s equipment was owned by the employer and he was aware that the contents of his hard drive were available to all other users and technicians with domain administration right. On the totality of the circumstances, Fish J. concluded that the teacher had a reasonable subjective expectation of privacy in his internet browsing history and the informational content of his work-issued laptop; it contained information that was meaningful, intimate and touching on his biographical core.

Having said this, however, the Supreme Court did not find the school to have acted unreasonably or in breach of s. 8 of the Charter when its technician inspected the teacher’s laptop in context of routine inspection or when the school subsequently seized the laptop at the instruction of the principal because the school’s principal had a statutory duty to maintain a safe school environment. However, the school’s lawful authority did not afford the police lawful authority to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of the computer material and examine its contents, according to the Supreme Court. In particular, Fish J. reasoned:

[67] In taking possession of the computer material and examining its contents, the police acted independently of the school board (R. v. Colarusso, 1994 CanLII 134 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, at pp. 58-60). The fact that the school board had acquired lawful possession of the laptop for its own administrative purposes did not vest in the police a delegated or derivative power to appropriate and search the computer for the purposes of a criminal investigation.

…

[73] The school board was, of course, legally entitled to inform the police of its discovery of contraband on the laptop. This would doubtless have permitted the police to obtain a warrant to search the computer for the contraband. But receipt of the computer from the school board did not afford the police warrantless access to the personal information contained within it. This information remained subject, at all relevant times, to Mr. Cole’s reasonable and subsisting expectation of privacy.

Having found that the police breached the teacher’s privacy rights under section 8 of the Charter, Fish J. embarked on an inquiry under s. 24(2) of the Charter, namely, whether the unconstitutionally-obtained evidence by the police should be excluded. Here, Fish J. considered a three-part balancing test set out in the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Grant[2]. In particular, Fish J. considered (i) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct of the police; (ii) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interest of the teacher; and (iii) the society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits. In setting aside the decision of the Court of Appeal and allowing the unconstitutionally-obtained evidence, Fish J. stated with respect to the first part of the Grant test:

[84] Regarding the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the courts below focused on the actions of Detective Constable Timothy Burtt, the officer who took possession of the computer material, who searched the discs, and who sent the laptop away for forensic examination. The trial judge concluded that this officer’s actions were ‘egregious’ (para. 26), and the Court of Appeal considered his conduct serious enough to favour exclusion.

[85] I am unable to share either conclusion.

[86] The police officer did not knowingly or deliberately disregard the warrant requirement. As events were unfolding in this case, the law governing privacy expectations in work computers was still unsettled. Without the guidance of appellate case law, D.C. Burtt believed, erroneously but understandably, that he had the power to search without a warrant.

[87] He did not act negligently or in bad faith. Nor does his conduct evidence insensitivity to Charter values, or an unacceptable ignorance of Mr. Cole’s rights under the Charter. The officer did not rely exclusively, as the courts below suggested, on his mistaken belief that the ownership of the laptop was necessarily determinative. While this was an important factor underlying his decision not to obtain a search warrant, the officer also turned his mind to whether Mr. Cole had an expectation of privacy in the laptop (p. 130). He was alert to the possibility that the hard drive contained private or privileged material (pp. 130-31 and 164). And he testified that he intended to respect Mr. Cole’s privacy interest in this regard (p. 131).

…

[89] …Where a police officer could have acted constitutionally but did not, this might indicate that the officer adopted a casual attitude toward — or, still worse, deliberately flouted — the individual’s Charter rights (Buhay, at paras. 63-64). But that is not this case: The officer, as mentioned earlier, appears to have sincerely, though erroneously, considered Mr. Cole’s Charter interests.

[90] Accordingly, in my view, the trial judge’s finding of ‘egregious’ conduct was tainted by clear and determinative error (Côté, at para. 51). On the undisputed evidence, the conduct of the officer was simply not an egregious breach of the Charter. As earlier seen, the officer did attach great importance to the school board’s ownership of the laptop, but not to the exclusion of other considerations. He did not ‘confuse ownership of hardware with privacy in the contents of software’ (trial reasons, para. 29).

With respect to the second part of the Grant test, Fish J. stated:

[91] Turning then to the impact of the breach on Mr. Cole’s Charter-protected interests, the question relates to ‘the extent to which the breach actually undermined the interests protected by the right infringed’ (Grant, at para. 76). In the context of a s. 8 breach, as here, the focus is on the magnitude or intensity of the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and on whether the search demeaned his or her dignity (R. v. Belnavis, 1997 CanLII 320 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341, at para. 40; Grant, at para. 78).

[92] In his s. 24(2)analysis, the trial judge neglected entirely to consider the diminished nature of Mr. Cole’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Likewise, the Court of Appeal overlooked the fact that the operational realities of Mr. Cole’s workplace attenuated the effect of the breach on his Charter-protected interests.

[93] Moreover, the courts below failed to consider the impact of the ‘discoverability’ of the computer evidence on the second Grant inquiry. As earlier noted, the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a warrant. Had he complied with the applicable constitutional requirements, the evidence would necessarily have been discovered. This further attenuated the impact of the breach on Mr. Cole’s Charter-protected interests (Côté, at para. 72).

Finally, with respect to the third part of the Grant test, Fish J. stated:

Finally, I turn to the third Grant inquiry: society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits. The question is ‘whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion’ (Grant, at para. 79).

[95] Not unlike the the considerations under the first and second inquiries, the considerations under this third inquiry must not be permitted to overwhelm the s. 24(2) analysis (Côté, at para. 48; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 (CanLII), 2009 SCC 34, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 40). They are nonetheless entitled to appropriate weight and, in the circumstances of this case, they clearly weigh against exclusion of the evidence.

[96] The laptop, the mirror image of its hard drive, and the disc containing Mr. Cole’s temporary Internet files are all highly reliable and probative physical evidence. And while excluding it would not “gut” the prosecution entirely, I accept the Crown’s submission that the forensic examination of the laptop, at least, is “critical”: the metadata on the laptop may allow the Crown to establish, for example, when the photographs were downloaded and whether they have ever been accessed.

[97] In sum, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The breach was not high on the scale of seriousness, and its impact was attenuated by both the diminished privacy interest and the discoverability of the evidence. The exclusion of the material would, however, have a marked negative impact on the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process.

For the above reasons, Fish J. did not exclude the evidence unlawfully obtained by the police.

While the case is a criminal one and engages an individual’s privacy rights under s. 8 of the Charter since it involves state (police) intrusion of an individual’s privacy rights, the privacy principles articulated by Fish J. will undoubtedly be considered by courts in future employment law cases and employers should be mindful of those principles in structuring their relationship with their employees.

It is recommended that employers should implement clear policies that define, in unequivocal terms, the employer’s expectations surrounding workplace computer use, including smartphone use, if employers provide such equipment to employees in an employment context. Although Fish J., in R. v. Cole, stated that workplace policies are not determinative of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy, if properly drafted a workplace policy combined with consistent employer actions in the workplace, may diminish, objectively, the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, where both the employer’s workplace policy and the employer’s actions in the workplace are consistent in prohibiting any personal use by employees of employer-issued computers or smartphones and where the employee has acknowledge receipt of employer’s policy that provides that any data sent, stored or received using the employer’s computer or smartphone is the property of the employer and the employer reserves the right to perform random checks or audits of the employee’s computer or smartphone use, the employee may be hard pressed to argue that he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Securities law in Canada is regulated provincially.  While many Canadian jurisdictions have harmonized their securities regimes in recent years, there are certain differences across Canada.  The laws that apply to each business (called an “issuer” under securities law, as an issuer of securities) and investor depend primarily on the jurisdiction in which that issuer or investor resides.  While securities laws differ across Canada, we note that there are greater differences for businesses located in the United States, or for those planning to distribute securities to any investors resident in the United States.  This article is based on securities laws applicable in British Columbia.

Under securities law, every issuance of a “security” requires (a) the publication of a prospectus by the issuer, and (b) registration of any person who is in the business of trading the security.  A “security” can be a wide variety of instruments or things, ranging from shares, units and options, to debt instruments and investment contracts – in effect, anything that would result in a person having an interest in the business of the issuer.  The prospectus and registration requirements are meant to protect investors from the risks associated with investment.  However, most small businesses are able to rely upon exemptions from these requirements for much of their corporate lifespan.  For the most part, these exemptions are found in National Instrument 45-106 of the Canadian Securities Administrators, “Prospectus and Registration Exemptions”.

The exemption that most businesses use in their initial stages of growth is called the Private Issuer Exemption.  Issuers that have distributed securities to fewer than 50 persons (not including employees and former employees) and that have not distributed securities of any class to members of the public are generally able to rely upon the Private Issuer Exemption.  Provided that an issuer complies with the detailed provisions of this exemption, including only distributing securities to certain categories of investors, it could use this exemption for a number of years.  In some cases, we have seen closely-held entities use this exemption for their entire corporate existence.  The categories of investors to whom issuers are able to distribute securities under this exemption include directors, officers and employees of the issuer, accredited investors (see the description below), immediate family members of directors and officers of the issuer, close personal friends and close business associates of directors and officers of the issuer, and existing security holders of the issuer.

Issuers who can no longer rely upon the Private Issuer Exemption, whether because they have distributed securities to more than 50 persons or because they wish to distribute securities to persons that are outside the designated categories of investors permitted under the Private Issuer Exemption, may be able to distribute securities in reliance on certain other prospectus and registration exemptions.  The most commonly used exemptions for small businesses are the Accredited Investor Exemption, the Minimum Amount Investment Exemption, the Family, Friends and Business Associates Exemption and the Offering Memorandum Exemption.

The Accredited Investor Exemption focuses on the attributes of the investor rather than the issuer itself.  In effect, the prospectus and registration requirements are considered not to apply to investors who have the financial means to absorb the loss of their entire investment, and the knowledge and experience to assess the risks associated with the investment.  While there are many classes of “accredited investors”, the most commonly used are (a) the class based on net worth, under which the investor, either alone or with their spouse, has net assets of at least $5,000,000, and (b) the class based on net income, under which the investor has a net income before taxes that exceeded $200,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years or whose net income before taxes combined with that of a spouse exceeded $300,000 in each of the two most recent calendar years and who, in either case, reasonably expects to exceed that net income level in the current calendar year.

The Minimum Amount Investment Exemption focuses on the amount of the investor’s financial investment.  Currently, this exemption applies to investors who invest at least $150,000 in securities of the issuer.  Use of this exemption, similar to the Accredited Investor exemption, assumes that a person who has the financial wherewithal to invest at least $150,000 has the financial means to absorb a loss, and the knowledge and experience to assess the risks associated with the investment, and therefore does not require the protection associated with a prospectus.

The Family, Friends and Business Associates Exemption is meant to apply where close personal friends and close business associates of directors and officers of the issuer make an investment, and therefore focusses on the relationship between the investor and the director or officer.  The investor must be able to demonstrate that they have a sufficiently close relationship with the director or officer to be able to properly evaluate the director’s or officer’s capabilities and trustworthiness.  The relationship in each case must be direct.

The Offering Memorandum Exemption gives an issuer access to a very broad range of prospective investors.  However, it does involve producing an offering memorandum in respect of the offered securities, which involves a substantial output of resources.  We do not recommend using this exemption unless an issuer has already exhausted their access to other exemptions and wishes to offer to the public, without becoming a publicly listed issuer.

We caution issuers and investors that most of these exemptions involve making certain filings with the local securities commission.  As well, their use requires a careful review of the issuer’s particular situation and the class of prospective investors who wish to invest.  Each exemption carries with it various requirements that are not addressed in this article, so if you are anticipating issuing securities we recommend speaking with one of our lawyers so we can provide you with appropriate advice.

The prospectus and registration requirements also apply on each occasion that a security is resold, again with certain exceptions.  We recognize that for most small businesses, investors plan to hold their investment for a lengthy period of time.  If this is not the case, investors need to be aware that their ability to transfer securities will depend on factors such as when the securities were first issued, under what exemptions they were issued, and the jurisdictions in which the transferor and transferee reside.

Securities law is complex, and in recent years securities regulators have been placing greater emphasis on compliance, even for those entities that are not publicly listed.  We recommend obtaining legal advice early as to the requirements that will apply to your business.

Please contact Jennifer MacGregor-Greer or Carol Alter Kerfoot for specific advice relating to the distribution of securities by your business.

In Globex Foreign Exchange Corporation v. Kelcher[1], three employees, David Kelcher, Mark MacLean, and Luciano Oliverio entered into employment contracts with Globex Foreign Exchange Corporation, a business engaged in foreign currency exchange. In 2003, each employee signed a non-competition and non-solicitation agreement comprising restrictive covenants.  MacLean agreed to the restrictions as part of his initial employment. Both Kelcher and Oliverio agreed to the restrictions during their employment, but did not receive any additional benefits as a result. In March 2005, the three employees were asked to sign more burdensome non-competition and non-solicitation restrictive covenants.  Objecting to these new restrictive covenants, Kelcher resigned and MacLean was fired.  Oliverio signed the new agreement, but resigned shortly thereafter. All three employees joined a rival firm.  In April 2005, Globex filed suit, claiming damages from loss of clients.

The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench ruled against Globex and held that MacLean had been wrongfully dimissed and was therefore relieved of the restrictive covenants he had consented to.  Further, the Court found that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable as against Kelcher and Oliverio for want of consideration, as the agreements were signed by both employees during the course of their employment, but had received nothing in return.  The Court found that consideration could be present in instances where there is mutual understanding between employer and employee that the employer will not exercise its right to lawfully terminate the employment if the employee agrees to the restrictive covenant; however, the Court found that such mutual understanding did not exist in this case. If such consideration had been present, the Court held that only Kelcher’s non-solicitation clause would have been enforceable because Oliverio’s non-solicitation clause was overly broad and thus unenforceable.

Globex appealed the decision to the Alberta Court of Appeal.  Madam Justice Hunt, writing for the majority, dismissed Globex’s appeal. In so holding, Madam Justice Hunt affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the wrongful dismissal of an employee will render that employee’s restrictive covenants unenforceable. 

Madam Justice Hunt provided a number of legitimate reasons for this longstanding principle of employment law.  The Court said:

Most particularly, to hold otherwise would reward employers for mistreating their employees. For example, an employer could hire a potential competitor, impose a restrictive covenant on the employee, then wrongfully dismiss her a short time later and take advantage of the restrictive covenant. This would be a highly effective, but manifestly unfair, way of reducing competition. A second justification (alluded to by Simon Brown L.J. in Rock Refrigeration) may be that enforcing a restrictive covenant in the face of wrongful termination prima facie negates the consideration (whether continued employment or something else) given by the employer to the employee when she accepted the restrictive covenant.

Madam Justice Hunt also affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that some fresh consideration must be provided by the employer when employees accept restrictive covenants during their employment.

In order for an employer to validly enforce a restrictive covenant against a departing employee, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that three criteria would have to be met.  First, the restrictive covenant has to be reasonable with respect to the geographic scope, length of time and the activity that is restricted.  Second, an employee must be dismissed either with cause or notice or, alternatively, the employee must have resigned. Third, if the employer imposes a more stringent restrictive covenant during the course of employment, the employer must provide fresh consideration such as a raise or bonus. Alternatively, there must be some understanding that the employment would continue as a result of the employee agreeing to the addition or amendment of the restrictive covenant.

This case provides a useful guide with respect to the factors a court will look at when determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants in employment agreements.

The one question sometimes arise is how to deal with a recalcitrant party who refuses to participate in the process. Various options may be available depending on the source of the mandatory mediation process. As an example, under the legislative model used in British Columbia, the defaulting party may ultimately find that their claim is dismissed or their defence is struck if they persistently refuse to engage in the mediation and the steps leading to it. Elsewhere where a judge is responsible for ordering the mediation, failure to comply with the Court’s Order could lead to a contempt citation. While these are draconian methods, the real objective of the mediator ought to be to ascertain why the party or parties, depending on the scheme employed, are objecting to the process and attempt to override through persuasion these concerns.

[1] Notice to Mediate