Archive for the ‘Corporate Governance’ Category

Jennifer MacGregor-Greer
Monday, March 9th, 2015    Posted by Jennifer MacGregor-Greer (posts)

In a previous article, we considered some of the situations in which a closely-held company might wish to expand its board.  This article will go on to consider how to identify possible board candidates.

Selecting board candidates is a process not to be taken lightly.  A company’s directors are responsible for setting its direction and maintaining its corporate governance standards – so the composition of a company’s board can have long-term implications.  If you simply plan to formalize an existing mentorship or adviser role, or if a large investor has negotiated a board seat as one of its investment conditions, you may know already who the director candidate is.  However, in all other cases, identifying suitable candidates is an important step.

The basic requirements for eligibility as a director under the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia) are that the director candidate:

  • is at least 18 years of age;
  • has not been found by a court to be incapable of managing his or her own affairs;
  • is not an undischarged bankrupt; and
  • has not been convicted of an offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a corporation or unincorporated business, or an offence involving fraud, with a few exceptions (including the person having received a pardon under the Criminal Records Act (Canada)).

Directors of BC companies are not required to be Canadian residents.  This is, however, not the case for corporations organized under the Canada Business Corporations Act, which requires 25% of a corporation’s directors to be Canadian residents.

Directors are also not required by statute to be shareholders of a company.  However, your company’s Articles may require directors to hold shares.  It is important to review your Articles to determine whether this is the case.

You may next wish to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the existing directors.  If the company’s founder is its sole director, typically that person may have industry expertise, but lack other skills – for instance, a high degree of financial literacy.  In other cases, especially if the founder is a serial entrepreneur, the founder may have excellent business skills but wish to add industry knowledge.  Since the board will set the company’s direction, oversee its finances and safeguard its governance practices, having the necessary skill set to do so is critical.

Another item to consider is your company’s goals and objectives.  Are you hoping to build a particular line of business in the next few years?  It may be useful to have a director who is knowledgeable about that line of business.  Are you intending to enter a certain market?  Having a director who knows the particular issues surrounding that market could be a determining factor in your success.

Finally, you may wish to consider independence and gender diversity when building your board.  Board independence has long been a requirement for public companies, and gender diversity is quickly becoming an important element in corporate governance best practice.  While securities laws require boards of public companies to consist of a majority of independent directors (i.e. directors who are not related to the management of the company and who have no other material relationship with the company), best practices for private issuers also require a meaningful number of independent directors.  Canadian securities regulators have also recently brought into effect “comply or explain” standards that require reporting issuers to disclose recruitment of women directors, and if no such recruitment has occurred, to explain why not.  While these diversity standards currently do not apply to companies that are not reporting issuers, it is reasonable to expect a trickle-down effect whereby investors in smaller companies will begin to demand a higher rate of diversity on boards.

Tags: , , ,

Posted by Jennifer MacGregor-Greer (posts) | Filed under Corporate Governance | ....
Jennifer MacGregor-Greer
Tuesday, March 3rd, 2015    Posted by Jennifer MacGregor-Greer (posts)

Many companies start their lives as closely-held entities with few shareholders and only one director, who is often the company’s founder and/or principal shareholder. However, as your company grows you may find that you feel uncomfortable being the sole decision-maker, or that others are asking you to add more directors.

Of course, if your company is a closely held family business, or if you are a sole shareholder, there may never be a need to bring on additional directors. The role of a company’s directors, according to the Business Corporations Act (British Columbia), is to “manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the company.” If the nature and extent of your company’s business is such that this role can be carried out effectively by a single director, having one director may be sufficient. But if it appears that this role can no longer be adequately fulfilled by a single director, it is time to consider your options. The following are some situations where it may be in the company’s best interest to appoint additional directors:

  • The company is seeking to attract large investors who wish to have a formal role in influencing corporate direction;
  • The company is expanding either geographically or by adding new business divisions, making it desirable to add a diversity of expertise to the board;
  • The company’s business is becoming more complex, making it desirable to add a range of skill sets (such as financial, legal, or industry-specific) to the board;
  • You wish to formally recognize a mentorship or advisory role by appointing a mentor or adviser to the board;
  • Your company’s Shareholders’ Agreement requires multiple directors;
  • You wish to add independent, objective viewpoints to the board; or
  • The company intends to become a reporting issuer under relevant securities law, making it necessary to raise its corporate governance standards in order to comply with best practices.

While having multiple directors generally enhances the governance of a company, this will only be the case if the directors are sufficiently knowledgeable and have the necessary skills to understand the company’s business and effectively carry out their roles. Other limitations to keep in mind include the following:

  • It is generally advisable to have an odd number of directors rather than an even number, since, depending on the company’s Articles, in many cases board decisions are made by a majority of directors. Having an odd number eliminates the uncertainty that could occur if a board decision is split 50/50.
  • The number of directors that your company may have might be limited by the provisions of your company’s Articles. It is worthwhile checking the Articles to determine if they contain any restrictions in this regard, and whether your Articles need to be amended before appointing additional directors.
  • Typically, directors are elected by the shareholders of the company who hold shares that carry voting rights. Depending on the number of shareholders in your company, it might be necessary to hold a shareholders’ meeting at which the new directors are elected.
  • If a company has too many directors, the governance benefits experienced by having a diverse board could be hampered by inefficiency. In all but the largest companies, typically it is not necessary to have more than five directors.

In a future article, we will consider the types of individuals you may wish to appoint as directors.

Tags: , , ,

Posted by Jennifer MacGregor-Greer (posts) | Filed under Corporate Governance | ....
Shafik Bhalloo
Tuesday, October 23rd, 2012    Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts)
Shafik Bhalloo
Shafik Bhalloo has been a partner of Kornfeld LLP since 2000. His practice is focused on labour and employment law, and on commercial and civil litigation. He is also an Adjudicator on the Employment Standards Tribunal and an Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Business Administration at Simon Fraser University.

 By Devin Lucas and Shafik Bhalloo

In Globex Foreign Exchange Corporation v. Kelcher[1], three employees, David Kelcher, Mark MacLean, and Luciano Oliverio entered into employment contracts with Globex Foreign Exchange Corporation, a business engaged in foreign currency exchange. In 2003, each employee signed a non-competition and non-solicitation agreement comprising restrictive covenants.  MacLean agreed to the restrictions as part of his initial employment. Both Kelcher and Oliverio agreed to the restrictions during their employment, but did not receive any additional benefits as a result. In March 2005, the three employees were asked to sign more burdensome non-competition and non-solicitation restrictive covenants.  Objecting to these new restrictive covenants, Kelcher resigned and MacLean was fired.  Oliverio signed the new agreement, but resigned shortly thereafter. All three employees joined a rival firm.  In April 2005, Globex filed suit, claiming damages from loss of clients.

The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench ruled against Globex and held that MacLean had been wrongfully dimissed and was therefore relieved of the restrictive covenants he had consented to.  Further, the Court found that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable as against Kelcher and Oliverio for want of consideration, as the agreements were signed by both employees during the course of their employment, but had received nothing in return.  The Court found that consideration could be present in instances where there is mutual understanding between employer and employee that the employer will not exercise its right to lawfully terminate the employment if the employee agrees to the restrictive covenant; however, the Court found that such mutual understanding did not exist in this case. If such consideration had been present, the Court held that only Kelcher’s non-solicitation clause would have been enforceable because Oliverio’s non-solicitation clause was overly broad and thus unenforceable.

Globex appealed the decision to the Alberta Court of Appeal.  Madam Justice Hunt, writing for the majority, dismissed Globex’s appeal. In so holding, Madam Justice Hunt affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the wrongful dismissal of an employee will render that employee’s restrictive covenants unenforceable. 

Madam Justice Hunt provided a number of legitimate reasons for this longstanding principle of employment law.  The Court said:

Most particularly, to hold otherwise would reward employers for mistreating their employees. For example, an employer could hire a potential competitor, impose a restrictive covenant on the employee, then wrongfully dismiss her a short time later and take advantage of the restrictive covenant. This would be a highly effective, but manifestly unfair, way of reducing competition. A second justification (alluded to by Simon Brown L.J. in Rock Refrigeration) may be that enforcing a restrictive covenant in the face of wrongful termination prima facie negates the consideration (whether continued employment or something else) given by the employer to the employee when she accepted the restrictive covenant.

Madam Justice Hunt also affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that some fresh consideration must be provided by the employer when employees accept restrictive covenants during their employment.

In order for an employer to validly enforce a restrictive covenant against a departing employee, the Alberta Court of Appeal held that three criteria would have to be met.  First, the restrictive covenant has to be reasonable with respect to the geographic scope, length of time and the activity that is restricted.  Second, an employee must be dismissed either with cause or notice or, alternatively, the employee must have resigned. Third, if the employer imposes a more stringent restrictive covenant during the course of employment, the employer must provide fresh consideration such as a raise or bonus. Alternatively, there must be some understanding that the employment would continue as a result of the employee agreeing to the addition or amendment of the restrictive covenant.

This case provides a useful guide with respect to the factors a court will look at when determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants in employment agreements.

[1] 2011 ABCA 240

Tags: , , , ,

Posted by Shafik Bhalloo (posts) | Filed under Corporate Governance, Labour & Employment | ....
Dan Parlow
Tuesday, January 18th, 2011    Posted by Dan Parlow (posts)
Dan Parlow
Dan is a partner at the firm of Kornfeld LLP. He helps resolve commercial disputes for clients including investors, brokerage houses and financial institutions in the realization of claims by creditors and over disputed investments; entrepreneurs in claims over business assets, shareholder and partnership interests and commercial property; estates, trusts and beneficiaries over disputed wills, trusts and related claims; clients of realtors, lawyers, accountants, brokers and investment advisors; and businesses in the telecom, oil & gas and high-tech industries.

On January 10, 2011, the British Columbia Securities Commission (the “Commission”) overturned the proxy solicitation process employed by the Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA) in connection with a special meeting of its members.  It is a rare case in which the governance standards of a self-regulated organization were subjected to review by a higher authority, and ironic given the MFDA’s role as regulator of the operations, standards of practice and business conduct of its member-dealers.  The MFDA’s mandate is “to enhance investor protection and strengthen public confidence in the Canadian mutual fund industry.”

The case involved a proposal to alter MFDA’s by-laws respecting the length of terms of directorship (“Proposal”). BCSC panel directed the MFDA to cease improperly soliciting proxies regarding a pending and controversial vote.

The Proposal

The Proposal was written by a four-person task force including two sitting directors whose very continuation in office was contingent upon approval of the proposal, giving rise to an inherent appearance of self-interest.

Although the task force believed that the proposal was supported by a “significant majority” of its members, they worried that they were at risk of defeat by a minority of opposed members who could prevent approval if the attendance at the meeting was low.  To mitigate this risk, the MFDA contacted members and asked them their opinions about the proposal, and offered them the opportunity, in the event they could not be present, to provide a proxy in favour of an MFDA director supportive of the Proposal.  However, no alternate or non-director proxy was offered.

The conflict of interest was refuted by the MFDA saying they acted with the “sincere intention of encouraging member participation in an important process and with absolutely no intention of pressuring any member.   However, the Commission appeared to doubt this intention, noting the MFDA’s failure to contact known opponents to the proposal.

Managing the Potential Conflict

The Commission drew a clear distinction between the proxy solicitation process among corporations and regulators. A shareholder of a corporation is entitled to vote arbitrarily, motivated only by self-interest.   However, it was held that the very relationship between the MFDA and a member creates an “inherent and foreseeable” risk that the member may feel pressure to vote in favour of management-sponsored resolutions if MFDA directors are involved in the proxy solicitation process.

In holding that this process would have led an objective observer to question the integrity and credibility of the MFDA, the Commission directed that any proxy solicitation be conducted through independent proxy solicitation service providers. Further, the Commission directed that the MFDA board’s role should be limited to ensuring that this independent process is appropriate and is being followed; and directed that MFDA members’ votes be kept confidential from its officials.


In its judgment, the Commission panel did praise the MFDA as an effective and credible regulator of mutual fund dealers generally, and emphasized that despite this finding on a narrow internal governance issue it was “not making any adverse findings about the MFDA’s overall integrity or credibility as” a self-regulatory organization.

Tags: , , , ,

Posted by Dan Parlow (posts) | Filed under Corporate Governance | Add a comment ....
Dan Parlow
Thursday, April 8th, 2010    Posted by Dan Parlow (posts)
Dan Parlow
Dan is a partner at the firm of Kornfeld LLP. He helps resolve commercial disputes for clients including investors, brokerage houses and financial institutions in the realization of claims by creditors and over disputed investments; entrepreneurs in claims over business assets, shareholder and partnership interests and commercial property; estates, trusts and beneficiaries over disputed wills, trusts and related claims; clients of realtors, lawyers, accountants, brokers and investment advisors; and businesses in the telecom, oil & gas and high-tech industries.

This is the fourth and final post in a series of posts on this subject. The full version of the article was published by the Institute of Corporate Directors in its Journal and and as a web resource.

Bad Faith and Self-Dealing

I would not allow corporations to exonerate directors in the event of bad faith, self-dealing or other instances of non-loyalty.

In the event the directors’ action is challenged, it will be the court’s job to determine whether the board’s decision was in fact taken disloyally.  This may involve review of the substance of a business decision made by an apparently well motivated board for the limited purpose of assessing whether that decision is so far beyond the bound of reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.  Delaware law shows that the courts are capable of making a reasoned distinction.

In the event of a conflict of interest, directors’ approval of a transaction can be set aside even where it had been subsequently approved by the shareholders after the conflicts of interest were disclosed.  Directors in such a case would be obliged to prove that the shareholders were fully informed and that the process was transparent in all respects.

As discussed in the Delaware Disney litigation involving its former president, Michael Ovitz, a “failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.”

A good example of a gross negligence claim without a bad faith component is seen in the proposed sale of the Lear Corporation: Lear Corporate Shareholder Litigation. A deal was struck with a potential suitor under which he would increase his offer by some $90,000,000 on the condition that the company pay him a $25,000,000 termination fee if the shareholders voted “no”. After the deal was rejected and the termination fee was paid, the plaintiffs alleged that the transaction was entered into in bad faith in that it had been a virtual certainty that the offer would be rejected by shareholders.  The Court once against struck the lawsuit because there were no facts indicating that the directors consciously acted in a manner contrary to the interests of Lear and its stockholders.

Read the rest of this entry »


Posted by Dan Parlow (posts) | Filed under Corporate Governance | Add a comment ....